Usage Guidelines
Use the ip verify unicast reverse-path interface command to mitigate problems caused by malformed or forged (spoofed) IP source addresses that are received by a router. Malformed or forged source addresses can indicate denial of service (DoS) attacks on the basis of source IP address spoofing.
When Unicast RPF is enabled on an interface, the router examines all packets that are received on that interface. The router checks to ensure that the source address appears in the Forwarding Information Base (FIB) and that it matches the interface on which the packet was received. This "look backwards" ability is available only when Cisco Express Forwarding is enabled on the router because the lookup relies on the presence of the FIB. Cisco Express Forwarding generates the FIB as part of its operation.
To use Unicast RPF, enable Cisco Express Forwarding switching or distributed Cisco Express Forwarding switching in the router. There is no need to configure the input interface for Cisco Express Forwarding switching. As long as Cisco Express Forwarding is running on the router, individual interfaces can be configured with other switching modes.
 Note |
It is very important for Cisco Express Forwarding to be configured globally in the router. Unicast RPF will not work without Cisco Express Forwarding.
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 Note |
Unicast RPF is an input function and is applied on the interface of a router only in the ingress direction.
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The Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding feature checks to determine whether any packet that is received at a router interface arrives on one of the best return paths to the source of the packet. The feature does this by doing a reverse lookup in the Cisco Express Forwarding table. If Unicast RPF does not find a reverse path for the packet, Unicast RPF can drop or forward the packet, depending on whether an ACL is specified in the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding command. If an ACL is specified in the command, then when (and only when) a packet fails the Unicast RPF check, the ACL is checked to determine whether the packet should be dropped (using a deny statement in the ACL) or forwarded (using a permit statement in the ACL). Whether a packet is dropped or forwarded, the packet is counted in the global IP traffic statistics for Unicast RPF drops and in the interface statistics for Unicast RPF.
If no ACL is specified in the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding command, the router drops the forged or malformed packet immediately and no ACL logging occurs. The router and interface Unicast RPF counters are updated.
Unicast RPF events can be logged by specifying the logging option for the ACL entries used by the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding command. Log information can be used to gather information about the attack, such as source address, time, and so on.
Where to Use RPF in Your Network
Unicast RPF may be used on interfaces in which only one path allows packets from valid source networks (networks contained in the FIB). Unicast RPF may also be used in cases for which a router has multiple paths to a given network, as long as the valid networks are switched via the incoming interfaces. Packets for invalid networks will be dropped. For example, routers at the edge of the network of an Internet service provider (ISP) are likely to have symmetrical reverse paths. Unicast RPF may still be applicable in certain multi-homed situations, provided that optional Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) attributes such as weight and local preference are used to achieve symmetric routing.
With Unicast RPF, all equal-cost "best" return paths are considered valid. This means that Unicast RPF works in cases where multiple return paths exist, provided that each path is equal to the others in terms of the routing cost (number of hops, weights, and so on) and as long as the route is in the FIB. Unicast RPF also functions where Enhanced Internet Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP) variants are being used and unequal candidate paths back to the source IP address exist.
For example, routers at the edge of the network of an ISP are more likely to have symmetrical reverse paths than routers that are in the core of the ISP network. Routers that are in the core of the ISP network have no guarantee that the best forwarding path out of the router will be the path selected for packets returning to the router. In this scenario, you should use the new form of the command, ip verify unicast source reachable-via, if there is a chance of asymmetrical routing.
Examples
The following example shows that the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding feature has been enabled on a serial interface:
ip cef
! or "ip cef distributed" for RSP+VIP based routers
!
interface serial 5/0/0
ip verify unicast reverse-path
The following example uses a very simple single-homed ISP to demonstrate the concepts of ingress and egress filters used in conjunction with Unicast RPF. The example illustrates an ISP-allocated classless interdomain routing (CIDR) block 192.168.202.128/28 that has both inbound and outbound filters on the upstream interface. Be aware that ISPs are usually not single-homed. Hence, provisions for asymmetrical flows (when outbound traffic goes out one link and returns via a different link) need to be designed into the filters on the border routers of the ISP.
ip cef distributed
!
interface Serial 5/0/0
description Connection to Upstream ISP
ip address 192.168.200.225 255.255.255.255
no ip redirects
no ip directed-broadcast
no ip proxy-arp
ip verify unicast reverse-path
ip access-group 111 in
ip access-group 110 out
!
access-list 110 permit ip 192.168.202.128 10.0.0.31 any
access-list 110 deny ip any any log
access-list 111 deny ip host 10.0.0.0 any log
access-list 111 deny ip 172.16.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log
access-list 111 deny ip 10.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log
access-list 111 deny ip 172.16.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log
access-list 111 deny ip 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log
access-list 111 deny ip 209.165.202.129 10.0.0.31 any log
access-list 111 permit ip any any
The following example demonstrates the use of ACLs and logging with Unicast RPF. In this example, extended ACL 197 provides entries that deny or permit network traffic for specific address ranges. Unicast RPF is configured on Ethernet interface 0 to check packets arriving at that interface.
For example, packets with a source address of 192.168.201.10 arriving at Ethernet interface 0 are dropped because of the deny statement in ACL 197. In this case, the ACL information is logged (the logging option is turned on for the ACL entry) and dropped packets are counted per-interface and globally. Packets with a source address of 192.168.201.100 arriving at Ethernet interface 0 are forwarded because of the permit statement in ACL 197. ACL information about dropped or suppressed packets is logged (the logging option is turned on for the ACL entry) to the log server.
ip cef distributed
!
int eth0/1/1
ip address 192.168.200.1 255.255.255.255
ip verify unicast reverse-path 197
!
int eth0/1/2
ip address 192.168.201.1 255.255.255.255
!
access-list 197 deny ip 192.168.201.0 10.0.0.63 any log-input
access-list 197 permit ip 192.168.201.64 10.0.0.63 any log-input
access-list 197 deny ip 192.168.201.128 10.0.0.63 any log-input
access-list 197 permit ip 192.168.201.192 10.0.0.63 any log-input
access-list 197 deny ip host 10.0.0.0 any log-input
access-list 197 deny ip 172.16.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log-input
access-list 197 deny ip 10.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log-input
access-list 197 deny ip 172.16.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log-input
access-list 197 deny ip 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.255 any log-input