 |
The router that sent the UPDATE was authorized to act on behalf of the AS it claims to represent; that is, the AS at the
front of the AS path.
|
 |
The AS from which the UPDATE emanates was authorized by the preceding AS in the AS path (in the UPDATE message) to advertise
the prefixes in the UPDATE.
|
 |
The first AS in the AS path was authorized, by the owner of the set of prefixes that are represented in the UPDATE, to
advertise those prefixes.
|
 |
If the UPDATE withdraws one or more routes (specified by the prefixes for the routes), then the sender must have advertised
each route prior to withdrawing it.
|
 |
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that represents the ownership and delegation of address prefixes and AS numbers
|
 |
Address Attestations that the owner of a prefix uses to authorize an AS to originate routes to the prefix
|
 |
Route Attestations that an AS creates to authorize a neighbor to advertise prefixes
|
 |
IPSec for point-to-point security of BGP traffic transmitted between routers
|
 |
An AA for each organization owning a prefix represented in the UPDATE (not for prefixes in the UPDATE that represent routes
being withdrawn)
|
 |
A certified public key for each organization owning a prefix in the UPDATE
|
 |
An RA corresponding to each AS along the path (ASn to AS1), where the RA generated and
signed by the router in ASn encompasses the Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) and the
path from ASn+1 through AS1
|
 |
A certified public key for each S-BGP router that signed an RA along the path (ASn to AS1),
to check the signatures on the corresponding RAs
|