

Using the Common Access Card for Remote Access VPN with the ASA 5500

Executive Summary

The Department of Defense (DoD) has implemented the Common Access Card (CAC) for all user authentications. Beginning in the summer of 2006, the CAC is mandatory for user authentication. Most DoD installations have converted their Active Directories to accept the CAC for user logons.

This paper details the steps necessary to enable ASA 5500 support for the DoD Common Access Card (CAC) when it is integrated with Active Directory (AD) to provide Smart Card Logon. When Smart Card Logon is enabled, several challenges are presented as the typical authentication and authorization credentials are eliminated. In its place, only certificate-based authentication can be used to allow the Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) to permit users to remotely access Virtual Private Network (VPN). This white paper focuses on implementing all of the functionality natively on the ASA 5500 with the Cisco VPN Client. Other solutions exist or may be possible using Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol/IP Security (L2TP/IPSec) with the Microsoft Client, or by introducing Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) to provide the authorization functions.

This document focuses on the basic configuration settings for enabling CAC Authentication on the ASA 5500. The ASA 5500 provides a multitude of additional features that should be explored to further enhance the end-user experience and to help secure the DoD Enterprise. For more information on the advanced configuration settings on the ASA 5500, visit http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_book09186a00806a6 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_book09186a00806a6 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_book09186a00806a6 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_book09186a00806a6 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_book09186a00806a6 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_book09186a00806a6

DoD Public Key Infrastructure and Common Access Cards

Public Key Infrastructure Overview

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) offers a scalable method of securing networks, reducing management overhead, and simplifying the deployment of network infrastructures by deploying security protocols including IPSec, Secure Shell (SSH), and Secure Socket Layer (SSL).

PKI is a system that manages encryption keys and identity information for the human and mechanical components of a network that participates in secured communications.

For a person or a piece of equipment to enroll in a PKI, the software on a user's computer generates a pair of encryption keys that will be used in secured communications: a public and a private key. In the case of the Common Access Card, the keys and certificates are stored on the CAC Smart Card.

The private key is never distributed or revealed. Conversely, the public key is freely distributed to any party that negotiates a secure communication. During the enrollment process (as shown in Figure 1), the user's public key is sent in the certificate request to the Certificate Authority (CA), which is responsible for the portion of the organization to which that entity belongs. The user sends the public key to the registration component of the CAs. Subsequently, the administrator approves the request and the CA generates the user's certificate. After the user receives a certificate and

installs it on the computer, he or she can participate in the secured network. For CACs, this entire process is handled when the CAC is provisioned.





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PKI is used most frequently for encrypted e-mail communications and IPSec tunnel negotiation, both of which use the identity and security features of the certificate. The identity components determine the identity of the user, their level of access to the particular type of communication under negotiation, and the encryption information that protects the communication from other parties who are not allowed access. Communicating parties will exchange certificates and inspect the presented information. The certificates are checked to see if they are within their validity period and if the certificate was generated by a trusted PKI. If all the identity information is appropriate, the public key is extracted from the certificate and used to establish an encrypted session.

Detailed documentation on PKI is readily available on the Internet or in numerous publications.

X.509 Certificate Fields

X.509 is the ubiquitous and well-known standard that defines basic PKI formats such as certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) format and enables basic interoperability. The standard has been widely used for years with many Internet applications such as SSL or IPSec. The most important pieces of information contained in the certificate are the:

- Subject
- Public key
- Signature of the CA
- · Certificate serial number
- Certificate expiration data
- · Algorithms used to generate the signature
- Key usage.

The CAC certificates include each of these attributes, plus additional attributes that are needed for authentication such as Subject Alternative Name (SAN) and Enhanced Key Usage (EKU).

Subject

The Subject consists of the Distinguished Name (DN), which is the certificate owner's full name and X.509 structure. For the CAC, this is in the format:

CN=LastName.FirstName.MiddleName.EDI/PI,OU=CONTRACTOR,OU=DoD,OU=PKI,OU= DoD,O=U.S. Government,C=US

Note: The CONTRACTOR designation only appears on the CACs of DoD Contractors.

There is little information to identify where the user belongs. It would be very desirable for the X.509 structure to include some type of information defining the user's organization.

Subject Alternative Name

On the CAC, the SAN field contains two fields. The first field is the email address of the user and the second is called the Principal Name (PN). The PN is an important field. This is the field that is used when the CAC is integrated into the Active Directory. The data in this field is in the format EDI/PI@mil.

The SAN field exists on two certificates on the CAC, the Signature Certificate and the Encryption Certificate. However, only the Signature Certificate contains the Principal Name field. CAC certificates are detailed in the CAC Certificate Section.

Enhanced Key Usage

The EKU field contains additional uses for a digital certificate. On the CAC, the certificate that is used for Active Directory Smart Card Logon contains this attribute with the Object Identifier (OID) for Smart Card Logon (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2). This field is different from the Key Usage (KU) field, which defines the primary purposes of the certificate and is backwards compatible with earlier versions of X.509.

CAC Components

The CAC provides two-factor authentication. To unlock the certificates on the CAC, the user must place the physical CAC in a reader and enter a Personal Identification Number (PIN). This unlocks the private keys stored on CAC. The private keys are never exported or placed on the workstation.

CAC Reader

The CAC Reader is an International Standards Organization (ISO) 7816 standard Smart Card Reader. The user must place the CAC into the reader in order for the information on the card to be read. Drivers must be installed on the PC in order for the CAC to be read by another piece of software called Middleware.

Middleware

The user interface to the CAC is the Middleware installed on the workstation. The Middleware prompts the user for the PIN, unlocks the CAC, and provides all communications between the Operating System and the CAC Reader. Typical Middleware is ActivCard Gold for CAC, Datakey Middleware for CAC, Netsign CAC, etc.

The communications between the CAC Middleware and the Windows Operating System (OS) occur through the Microsoft Certificate Application Programming Interface (CAPI). Using CAPI, the Middleware presents the certificates to the OS. Any applications that use the CAPI can access the certificates. Applications that do not use CAPI must interface directly with the Middleware Application Programming Interface (API). The Cisco VPN Client has the ability to use the CAPI.

CAC Certificates

Among other information, the CAC also contains the certificates needed to perform PKI functions. Three certificates are present on the CAC; each certificate provides separate functionality. Among the certificates, the only common identifier is the Subject field. This field contains an identical Distinguished Name on all three certificates.

ID Certificate

The ID Certificate contains the Key Usage fields that indicate that this certificate is to be used for Digital Signature and Non-Repudiation. This is the only certificate that does not contain either a SAN or EKU. This is also the only certificate signed by a CA designated as an email CA.

Signature Certificate

The Signature Certificate contains both the SAN and EKU. The SAN contains the email address of the user and the PN. This certificate EKU also has the Smart Card Logon purpose. This is the certificate that is used by Active Directory for Smart Card Logon. This is the only certificate that can be used when implementing the ASA using the methods outlined in this document.

Encryption Certificate

The Encryption Certificate contains a SAN, but the SAN contains only the email address and no PN. This certificate does not contain an EKU.

CAC and Active Directory Integration

This basic overview of the integration of CAC and Active Directory will provide simple background information on the processes involved when Active Directory is CAC-enabled.

Smart Card Logon Overview

When the Active Directory is CAC-enabled, the user must insert a CAC into the workstation reader and enter a PIN. The workstation then sends the PKI Credentials to the Active Directory using the Kerberos protocol. Refer to Microsoft's Smart Card Logon White Paper available from <u>http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/docs/sclogonwp.doc</u> for details.

Once the user's certificate is validated, the AD server uses the Principal Name taken from the SAN of the Signature Certificate to search for the user in the Active Directory and gain or deny access based on the settings found.

Implementing Windows NT Server Smart Card Logon

The basic steps in integrating CACs with Windows Active Directory are discussed in this section. Users wishing to implement CACs with Active Directory should refer to the official documentation.

Integrate DoD PKI CAs into MS Enterprise Root

To enable the AD to recognize and validate CAC certificates, all of the DoD PKI Root and Intermediate CAs must be imported into the Enterprise Root CA and the NT Authorized CA.

Note: While this integration requires an MS CA to be installed into the AD, the MS CA will not be used for issuing certificates.

Enable @mil

For the user credentials, the CAC-enabled AD will use the Principal Name field in the SAN to authenticate users. Since the Principal Name is in the form EDI/PI@mil, an alternative User Principal Name (UPN) suffix of "@mil" must be added. This will enable all of the user names to be changed to match the Principal Name field in the SAN of the Signature Certificate.

Individual User Settings

As discussed earlier, the AD User Principal Name must match the Principal Name field in the SAN. This can be accomplished by changing the Logon Name of the user in the Accounts tab. To force users to use Smart Cards, the "Smart card is required for interactive logon" check box is checked. (See Figure 2.) This removes all capabilities for the user to use a user name or password for any type of Active Directory authentication. Once this box is checked, the existing password is destroyed. If the Smart Card requirement is later removed, the user's password must be reset.

ad Woolwine 6 P	roperties			?
Member Of Remote contro General Addre:		nal Service	onment s Profile Telephones	Sessions COM+ Organization
<u>U</u> ser logon name: 1160082069	N	@mil		•
User logon name (CISCO\	pre- <u>W</u> indows 200	10): 116008	2069	
Logon Hours	Log On I	o		
C Account is s		not be deleg	gated	- - -
Account expires • Ne <u>v</u> er C <u>E</u> nd of:	Tuesday ,	June	13, 2006	Y
		эк	Cancel	Apply

Figure 2. CAC-Enabled Active Directory User Entry

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CAC Integration Issues

Because the CAC provides X.509-compliant PKI Certificates, it is desirable for them to be used for all authentication efforts. While the certificates rely on solid industry standards, the architecture of the DoD PKI and AD integration introduce several challenges.

The Authorization Problem

Authentication is easy. Authentication is simply validating that an entity is actually who they claim to be. In the case of PKI, we can guarantee that the entity that presents a certificate is who they say they are because they present their signed public certificate. Since the public certificate is signed by a trusted CA, the certificate is valid and the entity is verified.

Authorization is another story. Just because an entity presents a valid certificate does not mean that entity should have access to a network device. If we were only to authenticate users presenting CACs, then every one of millions of CAC holders would have identical access to network resources. Authorization allows the supplied credentials during Authentication to be used to determine the entity rights to access a system.

Unfortunately, the CAC certificates do not have very much identifying information. The only common user identity field among all of the certificates is the Subject Name. Unfortunately, the

Subject Name consists of only the Common Name, and the various Organizational Unit (OU) fields. These fields do not provide any type of hierarchy to identify which organization the user belongs to.

Active Directory Integration Challenges

Subject Name or Subject Alternative Name

Prior to version 7.2.1.4, the ASA can only use fields from the Subject Name of the certificate for authorization.

With version 7.2.1.4 of ASA, the Principal Name field can be extracted from the Subject Alternative Name field on the certificate, allowing the CAC to be used for authorization.

Smart Card Login Required

Because the Smart card is required for interactive logon setting is selected, it effectively eliminates the password from the user account. Kerberos authentication and authorization is impossible. Fortunately, Active Directory allows for Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) queries against the database. The LDAP structure for a typical AD user record is illustrated in Figure 3.

With the use of LDAP Authorization, the problem of all CAC users having access to the ASA VPN is eliminated. Only users that are in the Active Directory will have access to the ASA.

Browser root	Name	Value	Туре	Size	
, CACDemo-CISCO	objectClass	top	text attribute	3	_
CN=Builtin	objectClass	person	text attribute	6	
CN=Computers	ObjectClass	organizationalPerson	text attribute	20	
OU=Domain Controllers	ObjectClass	user	text attribute	4	
CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals	En	Chad Woolwine 1	text attribute	15	
CN=Infrastructure CN=LostAndFound	III sn	Woolwine 1	text attribute	10	
CN=CDSCARDFOUND CN=NTDS Quotas	givenName	Chad	text attribute	4	
E CN=Program Data	distinguishedName	CN=Chad Woolwine 1, CN=Users, DC=cisco, DC=dod, DC=mil	text attribute	50	
E CN=System	instanceType	4	text attribute	1	
E CN=Users	whenCreated	20060511185055.0Z	text attribute	17	
CN=ACSUser	(III) when Changed	20060513173618.0Z	text attribute	17	
CN=Administrator	displayName	Chad Woolwine 1	text attribute	15	
CN=Cert Publishers	III uSNCreated	24773	text attribute	5	
CN=CERTSVC_DCOM_ACCESS	I uSNChanged	29554	text attribute	5	
CN=Chad L. Woolwine	name	Chad Woolwine 1	text attribute	15	
CN=Chad Woolwine 1	i objectGUID	42 F9 4F 40 04 E7 98 4F B7 45 6A 75 B7 92 1E F7	binary attribute	16	
CN=Chad Woolwine 6	I userAccountControl	262656	text attribute	6	
— CN=DHCP Administrators	badPwdCount	0	text attribute	1	
CN=DHCP Users	CodePage	0	text attribute	1	
E CN=DnsAdmins	CountryCode	0	text attribute	1	
CN=DnsUpdateProxy	badPasswordTime	0	text attribute	1	
CN=Domain Admins	□ lastLogoff	0	text attribute	1	
CN=Domain Computers	IastLogon	127921074933127500	text attribute	18	
CN=Domain Controllers CN=Domain Guests	pwdLastSet	127918470559675000	text attribute	18	
CN=Domain Users	primaryGroupID	513	text attribute	3	
CN=Enterprise Admins	I objectSid	01 05 00 00 00 00 00 05 15 00 00 00 74 CF 48 A3	binary attribute	28	
+ CN=Group Policy Creator Owners	accountExpires	9223372036854775807	text attribute	19	
T CN=Guest	IogonCount	6	text attribute	1	
CN=HelpServicesGroup	■ sAMAccountName	1160082018	text attribute	10	
🗉 🧰 CN=krbtgt	sAMAccountType	805306368	text attribute	9	
CN=RAS and IAS Servers	userPrincipalName	1160082018@mil	text attribute	14	
🖅 🧰 CN=Schema Admins	objectCategory	CN=Person, CN=Schema, CN=Configuration, DC=cisco, DC=dod, DC=mil	text attribute	59	
E CN=SUPPORT_388945a0	III d5CorePropagationData	20060514190939.02	text attribute	17	
CN=TelnetClients	I dSCorePropagationData	16010101000001.02	text attribute	17	
😥 🧰 DC=ForestDnsZones	lastLogonTimestamp	127920153788750000	text attribute	18	
DC=DomainDnsZones	28 createTimeStamp	20060511185055.02	operational attribute	17	
CN=Configuration	2 modifyTimeStamp	20060513173618.02	operational attribute	17	
I, Michigan J, OpenLDAP	SW subSchemaSubEntry	CN=Aggregate,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=cisco,DC=dod,DC=mil	operational attribute	62	
G, Unizeto CERTUM					
DAPObjectClasses: Total: 220 Invald: 0 Duplicated: 0 MatchingUlues: Total: 0 Invald: 0 Duplicated: 0 MatchingUlues: Total: 0 Invald: 0 Duplicated: 0 xcestfuly: connected to 10.10.100.2 RROR 81 (2 and contact LDAP server RROR 81 (2 and contact LDAP server RROR 81 (2 and contact LDAP server RROR 81 (2 and contact LDAP server					

Figure 3. Active Directory LDAP User Entry

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Recommendations

Active Directory Modification

In most cases, the Active Directory can be used with little or no modification. However, setting a few optional components can greatly enhance the customizability of the solution.

Allow Dial-In

One method to control access to Remote Access VPN on the ASA is to use the Dial-in Access controls available in Active Directory. The ASA can interpret this value and make the appropriate authorization decision based on this value. There are three possible combinations for this checkbox. By setting the checkbox to Allow access or Control access through Remote Access Policy, access will be granted. Setting the checkbox to Deny access will deny access.

ASA External or Internal Group Policy

Another option is to leverage the Active Directory to define the ASA Group Policy to which the user settings will be assigned. This is possible by using a powerful feature in the ASA's LDAP settings called the LDAP Attribute Map. Using the Attribute Map, any field in AD can be remapped to an LDAP attribute that the ASA understands.

When the ASA encounters a user with a value defining an ASA Group Policy, it will do another LDAP query for a username that corresponds to that Group Policy. The settings in that account will be used to define VPN attributes. This functionality does require additional "Dummy" users to be configured in Active Directory.

Note: These "Dummy" users should be configured in Active Directory so that a rogue user will not have access to these accounts.

Extending the AD Schema

While not required, Active Directory schema extension is another option to enable AD/CAC integration on the ASA. Active Directory schema extension is required for ASA versions prior to version 7.2.1.4 and for all versions of the VPN3000. Documentation on AD schema extension is available at

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806 3b318.html#wp1577162.

ASA Configuration

The ASA configuration examples contained below will use the Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) Graphical User Interface (GUI) for configuration. Appendix A contains details on the CLI configuration of ASA to support the AD and CAC integration.

PKI Certificates

At minimum, five certificates need to be installed on the ASA. The DoD PKI now has two root CAs that need to be installed. The ASA will also need a certificate for itself and the certificate of the subordinate CA that signs the ASA's certificate. The final certificate is used to authenticate the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server.

Note: Although it is possible to install the DOD PKI certificates in any order, best results are achieved by authenticating the root certificates before the ASA and Intermediate CA certificates are installed. Also, the ASA needs connectivity to DISA to validate any certificates after the roots are installed. If there are any errors encountered during installation of the ASA or Intermediate CA certificates, disable revocation checking until the OCSP configuration is completed and connectivity to DISA is achieved.

Trustpoint Creation

To create the root trustpoints, choose Properties > Certificate > Trustpoint > Configuration and hit Add. Give the Root trustpoints a name that identifies them as the root. (See Figure 4.) The Key Pair and Enrollment parameters are not as important as the ASA and will not be requesting a certificate from this Certificate Authority.

ollment Certificate Parameters can be specified.
L Retrieval Policy CRL Retrieval Method OCSP Rules Advanc
Show Details New Key Pair
Confirm Challenge Password:
minutes
(Use 0 to indicate unlimited retries)

For revocation, choose OCSP. Be sure to uncheck the option to validate certificates on error. (See Figure 5.)

Figure 5. Root Trustpoint Revocation Method

Figure 4.

Root Trustpoint

📬 Add Trustpoint Co	nfiguration					×			
Trustpoint Name:	JITC-Root								
Generate a self-si If this option is ena			eters can be specified.						
Enrollment Settings	Revocation Check	CRL Retrieval Policy	CRL Retrieval Method	OCSP Rules	Advanced				
O Do not check	certificates for rev	ocation							
Revocation	Check certificates for revocation Revocation Methods Specify the methods used for revocation checking and their order. If both methods are selected, the second method will be used only if the first one returns error. CRL Add >> Move Up Move Up Move Down								
Consider	certificate valid if r	evocation checking re	turns errors						
	ОК	Cancel	Help						

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The CRL tabs can be left blank, as OCSP will be used for revocation checking. OCSP rules will be added later, if necessary.

On the Advanced tab, add the OCSP Uniform Resource Location (URL) (check the box if nonce is not required) and check the following three boxes. (See Figure 6.) The boxes control how certificate chaining and revocation will function. By checking all three boxes, the root CA Trustpoint configuration will determine how revocation checking will be done for all subordinate CAs.

Figure 6. Root Trustpoint Advanced Tab

Generate a self-s	-	on enrollment Pair and Certificate Param	-t t idiad		
		ck CRL Retrieval Policy	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	OCSP Rules	Advanced
Cache Refre	next CRL update	status Protocol (OCSP)	•]	
Accept cert		y the subordinate CAs of trustpoint to validate any		ssued by the	_

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The next trustpoint to configure is the trustpoint that the ASA will be enrolling. For the subordinate CA Trustpoint, be sure to include a Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) key pair, choose manual enrollment, and modify the Certificate Parameters by clicking the Certificate Parameters button (Figure 7).

📬 Add Trustpoint Configuration	×
Trustpoint Name: JTC-CA7	
Generate a self-signed certificate on enrollment If this option is enabled, only Key Pair and Certificate Parameters can be specified.	
Enrollment Settings Revocation Check CRL Retrieval Policy CRL Retrieval Method OCSP Rules Advance	ed
Key Pair: DOD-PKI Show Details New Key Pair	
Challenge Confirm Challenge Password: Password:	
Enrollment Mode can only be specified if there are no certificates associated with this trustpoint.	
Enrollment Mode Automatic enrollment can only be specified if the selected key pair is of type RSA.	
Use manual enrollment	
O Use automatic enrollment	
Enrolment URL: http://	
Retry Period: 1 minutes	
Retry Count: 0 (Use 0 to indicate unlimited retries)	
Certificate Parameters	
OK Cancel Help	

Figure 7. Subordinate CA Enrollment Settings

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For enrollment CA, choose Use none for FQDN, and leave the email address, IP address, and serial number fields blank (Figure 8). Click the Edit button to alter the Subject Distinguished Name field.

Subject DN:	Edit
FQDN	
O Use FQDN of the device	
O Specify FQDN	
 Use none 	
E-mail:	
P Address:	
P Address:	

Figure 8. Certificate Parameters

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In the Distinguished Name parameters (Figure 9), enter the proper attributes as directed by the DoD PKI Program Management Organization (PMO). Typically, these are CN=<FQDN of device>,OU=PKI,

OU=DoD,O=U.S. Government,C=US.

			Attribute	Value
(anala)	a na wata a		Common Name (CN)	asa.cisco.dod.mil
Attribute	to be Added		Department (OU)	PKI
	Select Attribute 🗸	Add >>	Department (OU)	DoD
Attribute: -	Select Attribute 🎽	Add >>	Company Name (O)	U.S. Government
			Country (C)	US
alue:		Delete		

Figure 9. Distinguished Name

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The CRL, Revocation Checking, and Advanced Tabs should be configured the same as the Root.

Trustpoint Authentication

The next step is to install (or Authenticate) the CA certificates for the trustpoints. The Root Certificates, intermediate CA Certificate and any OCSP self-signed certificates must be installed. These certificates can be obtained from the DoD PKI PMO and should be saved locally as Base64 encoded files. (See Figure 10.)

Figure 10. CA Certificate as Base64 File

🔊 jitc-ocspcer - Notepad	
Eile Edit Format View Help	
BEGIN CERTIFICATE MIICQTCCAaggAwIBAGIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJ1CZEY MBYGALUEChMPVS5TL1BHb321cm5t2w50MQwwCgYDVQQLEwNEb0QxF2AVBgNVBAMT DJDVJMgSk1UQyBPQ1NQMB4XDTALMDEyNTIXMZMwNF0xDTA4M0MXNTIXMZMWNF0w TjELMAkGALUEBhMCdXMxGDAWBgNVBAOTD1UUUY4gR2922XJUbWVUdDEMMAOGA1UE CXMDRG9EMRCwFQYDVQQDEw5SQL2TIEpJVEMgT0NTUDCBn2ANBgkqhkiG9W0BAQEF AAOBjQAwgYKCgYEAWRGr2V2EE142pgaV2zSqicmUX+4VcnfFbDKBwdhM5TY3J18 110g1bHEc5jMg0try5Q2HLE;3reffQwSXpv5SDKZLvh2h+hJF22AP3yU4v6gRq0 8pAbkse/16FFUQamJfjI1NaxmSNMwLCD/HyPJDvG1Z0GDJEaR5xRuMn8rVECAWEA AAMWC0WCQVDVROTBAIWADAgBgNVHSUBAF8EFjAUBggrBgEF8QCDAQYIKWYBBQUH Awkw0QYJK0ZINCANAQEFBQADgYEAOHrwB0UFBU+y+6CLY6V6AET2VXP8mwh1a7pC 19MCU80iQyCJM6nSC0xKY22xPbfeyP8BYeGpZC+nGpII2UbErBGt/wptEmHDvRIC yLdY3Uky8E4d61/9/du/QyLvmvK2k+vIXwdTsihB8STKnxtaBDuJnT2nM0SeIAjB 517KMhC= END CERTIFICATE	
	~
<u>×</u>	2;

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To authenticate a trustpoint, choose Properties > Certificate > Authentication. Choose each trustpoint from the drop down box and paste the Base64 encoded certificate text into the dialog box. (See Figure 11.) Click Authenticate to validate the certificate.

Figure 11. Trustpoint Authentication

le Options To	ols <u>Wi</u> zards <u>H</u> elp		Search:	Find
Home	w 💭		Save Help	
kterfaces Secuty Policy MAT NAT SP PS PS CSD Manager CSD Manager CSD Manager CSD Manager CSD Manager CSD Manager CSD Manager CSD Manager	Sontouritions Properties 2 Co Startus Witard AAA Stopp AAA Stopp AAB Spooling AAB Spooling AAB Stop AAB Stop	Authentication Authenticate a CA certificate. As the result of authenticate a CA certificate. As the result of authenticate function in the device. Trustpoint Name: Trustpoint Name: Trustpoint Name: Trustpoint Name: Certificate text can be specified if the selection of the device. Certificate Text Trustpoint from a file: Deport from a file: Deport from a	Edt New	

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The ASA will provide notification on successful authentication. (See Figure 12.) The Authentication needs to be repeated for each trustpoint.

Figure 12. Successful Trustpoint Authentication



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Certificate Enrollment

In order to support two-way certificate authentication, the ASA will need a certificate installed. To obtain a certificate, the ASA must enroll with a subordinate CA. (See Figure 13.) The process for obtaining device certificates can be obtained from the DoD PKI PMO. When requesting a certificate, a request for an SSL server certificate is acceptable for use on the ASA.

Figure 13. Certificate Enrollment



To request a certificate, a PKCS10 request must be made by the ASA. Choose Properties > Certificate > Enrollment, select the correct CA, and click Enroll to generate an enrollment request. Copy the text from the enrollment request window (Figure 14) and paste it into the CA's Certificate Request Form (Figure 15).

Figure 14. Certificate Enrollment Request



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Figure 15. Certificate Request Form

🗿 https://ca-7.c3pki.nit.disa.mi	/ca/profileSelect?profileId=re	egularSSL - Micros	oft Internet Explore	, 💽	
<u>File E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew F <u>a</u> vorites <u>T</u> ools	Help				.
🚱 Back 🔹 📀 🔹 🛃 🛃	Search 🥎 Favorites	🛛 🖉 🖓	🗹 • 🔜 🛍 🛛	8 😐 🚳	
Address 🛃 https://ca-7.c3pki.nit.disa.m	l/ca/profileSelect?profileId=regularSS	5L		🖌 🄁 Co	Links »
Certificate Profile Use this form to submit the re	quest.				<u></u>
Certificate Profile - Regular This certificate profile is for e		certificates.			
Inputs					
• Certificate Request Type	PKCS#10				_
• Certificate Request	HIIBvTCCASYCAQAwXzELJ 2ZXJu bWVudDENNAoGA1UECxMDJ zYS5j aXNjby5kb2QubWlsMIGfl Q+ara MstEDCt31zXY3Lunoml+1 TFEon ieGSR8LKa87n05GdlQc1: S36P9	RG9ENQuwCgYDVQ MAOGCSqGSIb3DQ W2Ed9gDjJNOQJS	QLEwNQSOkxGj&YBg EBAQU&&4GN&DCB10 NbLn&C1rdR1H4tUJ	gNVBAMTEWF 2KBgQCJHQ7 AbDk2Fd1rX	<
Requestor Name	Chad Woolwine				
Requestor Email	woolwine@cisco.com				
• Requestor Phone	713-448-1541				
Submit					
Done			A 🔿	Internet	×
See Done				nicemec	

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Once the certificate request is submitted, follow the documented process to ensure that the certificate is generated. Once the certificate is generated, it must be retrieved from the CA and installed on the ASA.

Copy the Base64 encoded certificate from the CA Web page (Figure 16) to the ASA's Import Certificate page (Figure 17). Click Import to import the certificate into the ASA.

Figure 16. Certificate	Retrieval
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the following format can be used to install this certificate into a server.		
Base 64 encoded certificate		
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A STAIBLSTETHBEGALUECXHKQ090VFJBQLRPUjEANBGGALUEAXHRYXNHLmNpc2L ZGWDQYKGZTHVCHAQEBBQABGYDAHIGJAGBAIKADEDSGGSYGOYQOHK3XXNJ5cu6 ZGWDQYKGZTHVCHAQEBBQABGYDAHIGJAGABKUBSIGJ2UHWSprzuc7XZVBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc7XZVBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc7X2VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6vApX56SrsAOLxz3JLfo/1xeQ6svtOmisidy2NdBsprzuc72VBzV/c1/WmE 6v40/y22V2V2VD0W9A06JL20Lx1WNVSSTL1U9HEdvdmVybm11bn2HsWKDJTNeVO 1EUJJTJ)s0U1H2REb001HmNvJTNVVSSTL1U9HEdvdmVybm11bn2HmNJJTNVVU 6v52ZV2V2V2Om9Au6JL21L2H1 WJsL2NuJTNKRS9EJTIW00x8U1N1HJAsJTUSK1U9VU9VBENBLTC1HmHVdSU2ZFF 6g9EJTJ)s0U2FUU941HJBHb32Lcm5L2VS0JTJ}Y9U22FVTNBYALU14L0PHaU 00/GeFMA0GCSqGSIDSD02BB0UAA6BACx1JNVaNSb5D1mKVvEH951C5g3SRgAvBf 903o79JnTm312q5LSUS0LKHBNVZ1JTNtcC07Ck5BsJ6Gba6A556Bc9d92PF3UUN 10/JQ4/a6JAxKFefrxa1/x1KHJQHq1DDHuCFTaSyJC1/x5r END_CERTIFICATE Nase 64 encoded certificate with CA certificate chain in pkcs7 format	<pre>intSbyR32AOHr intSbyR32AOHr intSbyR32AOHr 5)ggGYMIIBIDAf s2GFw01byRargsNAF s2GFw01byRargsNAF s2GFw01byR2B1JTNk 4/Y2VydG1maNh fWm010LmFpcZFu 3LSSU9Y291JTNk bwGVJY12IAUUC a6OFTLppx00CfF</pre>	
A & TAIBLSTETHBEGALUECXHKQ090VFJBQLRPUjEANBGGALUEAXHRYXNHLmNpc2 22wDQYKGZINvCHAQBBQADgYOAHIGJAGBALKDEDSGGTUYQUU(1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1	WLMRVZCStaUwe +1aXSbYR32AOMe +1aXSbYR32AOMe 53ggGYMIB9LDAF 10WGVMErgSNAF 12GFw0102wAFR 52GFw0102wAFR 52GFw0102wAFR 52GFw0102wAFR 12GFw0102wAFR 10WGVY121AWC n60ETLppx00CfF -8RtMh1+00P0rd	
A.STAJBLSTETHEECALUEC.XHK0050VFJBQ1PPUjEAHBgGALUEAXHRYÄNHLmNpc21 j280DQYJKo2ThvcNAQEBBQADgYOXHIGJAGGBAIkdDzDSqtoyyOQHK3fXNdjcu64 j280DQYJKo2ThvcNAQEBBQADgYOXHIGJAGGBAIkdDzDSqtoyyOQHK3fXNdjcu64 f6vApX565r3AOLxcs3Lfc/1xeQ6svt0ai4p9b/by33yxa5CSUVfNUegPagHBAA j6VHSHEGOAUdgB5DNSLFaoN2 weWo61Ly9bc6n0 yAdBgWN4PEFgQUK8U6MS ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2ygg2mgg2aGg2f ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2ygg2mgg2aGg2f ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2ygg2mgg2aGg2f ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2ygg2mgg2aGg2f ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2ygg2mg2aGg2f ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2ygg2mg28aGg2f ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2yg27mg28aGg2f ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg2yg27mg28aGg2 ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg28g2 ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAgWgMIGqBgNVHR8EgaIwg28wg28g2 ig/UaN4wDgYDVRDPAQH/BAQDAGHAGHACXIJWYRAN58D ig/UaN4ABJ29 i	NULREYZCSE a Wur ei also YR32 AONR also X R1 bex R1 19 Ld 3 ggg(Y H1 E B LA z 1 U WG YH z G G MA E C W J W Z 9 J C M W K D M LO LM R D Z E U S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K S SU YZ 9 L J M K S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K S S	
SASTAIBLSTETHBEGALUEC.NHK0050VFJBQ1PBUJEAHBGGALUEA.NHFNGNHLmNpc21 220H02VJKC2ThvChAQEBBQAbgVDAHIGJAGBAIKdbEDSqtoyVQHK3YNAJsud6 230H02VJKC2ThvChAQEBBQAbgVDAHIGJAGBAIKdbEDSqtoyVQHK3YXNJsud6 240H02VJKC2ThvChAQEBBQTV2VEVD014995/by3JyxaSCSUVTNUE2PAgHBAA 240H3HEGAUAGBSDENLSJFa0X200F011y9C6H005JABGMVH04EFgQUK8U6NS 250H35MC404Dg3DVDLADHADAV7241M2ETOQ1NJBDTEFTUYUVHND1MJJSKSVKDJT1w00 250JJJ3D3U1M2RED021MENJJTKVSTSILJYBE404m3ybm11ba01Mm3JJTKVVI 250JJ3D3U1M2RED021MENJJTKVSTSILJYBE404m3ybm11ba01Mm3JJTKVVI 250JJ3D3U1M2RED021MENJJTKVSTSILJYBE404m3ybm11ba01Mm3JJTKVVI 250JJ3D3U1M2RED021MENJJTKVSJTLJYBE404m3ybm11ba01Mm3JJTKVVI 250JJ3D3U1M2RED021MENJJTKVSJTLJYBE404M3ybm11ba01Mm3JJTKVVI 250JJ3D3U1M2RED021MENJJTKVSJTLJYBE404M3ybm11ba01Mm3JJTKVVI 250JJ3D3U1M2RED021ME405ACXJJW2NS5HTW4HZ9bCRbC04121k2H1 250JJ3D301M2RE59EJTWQ0X8U1M1MJASJTIWSLUGVUVHB9ELTC1Mm1VASU22FT 250S9JJ3D3U22FUUJ941M3BB9321cm522W30470JYV22FVTHBYGA1U41AQPHA4 200J94/a6JAXKXFE2Exa1/x1KMjQHq1DDHuCFIaSyJCI/x5c END CERTIFICATE 2385654 encoded certificate with CA certificate chain in pkc57 format BEGIN CERTIFICATE HIKWYUK021hv2NAQeC01IKVDCCCrgCAQEADAPBgkqhki6990BBWGgAgQA071 HICCANKWgMVBA0TD1UUUY4g2922ZJJubWVudDEHMA0GA1UECxMDRG940BBWGgAgQA071	NULREYZCSE a Wur ei also YR32 AONR also X R1 bex R1 19 Ld 3 ggg(Y H1 E B LA z 1 U WG YH z G G MA E C W J W Z 9 J C M W K D M LO LM R D Z E U S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K S SU YZ 9 L J M K S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K S S	
A STAIBLSTETHBEGAIUECXHRQO9OVFJBQIPPUJEAHBGGAIUEAXHRYXNhLmNpc1 ZSUDQYIKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgYOAHIGAAGBAIKADED5qcoyQOHKJSXNJcuk SAIIJiucAKkeIGUiiJQBOTYVJeKUHSiJJ2VHWPpruc7X2VB2V(-1/WmE) GvApXS65csAOLxzsJLfc/1xeQGevt0ai4p9b/by3JyxaSCSUVFNUeZyPAyHEAA SgNVHSHEGDAWgBSDLNSLJFaoN2wqW7061Ly9bC6N0jAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUKBU6NS SgVUSHWBGTVNOFAOH/BAODAgUgHIGABGNVHRBEgaIwgZwgZagZaGgZA SySuaXQuzGI2YSSCaWw7241NZETOUN5BDTEFTUyUyHNHINJBKSVRJTWOO HCJJJJBAUHARTWADFAOH/BAODAgUgHIGABGNVHRBEgaIwgZwgZagZaGgZA SySuaXQuzGI2YSSCaWw7241NZETOUN5BTLVHRBCAUWJYMNINDOIMM0JJNNKVN HCJJJJBAUHARED6UHRNJTKKYSTLIVHEAVAWWyMNINDOIMM0JINKYJ HCSJZYVZF0aWubGIadbcIadbcIaVSLUYHVSSEHYWCIZybGRhcDovL21kZH MJSLZNuJTNKRE9EJTIVQOx8UHHNJTKXYZJJJNVCVF0961CAUGABCAU AQSFNAOCSqGSTb3DQEBBQUAAGBACXIJNYwANSAbJTKVVFH951CBgsSRgAxWff 190307JJNTA124C5LWGLXHWNYTKYJJThrCC07cocNe6a6ASUBGOg092PF3UW D00/JQ4/a6JAXKXFEfrxa1/X1KHJQHqIDDHuCFIaSyJCI/X5f END CERTIFICATE Base 64 encoded certificate with CA certificate chain in pkcs7 format BEGIN CERTIFICATE HIKKWYJKOZINAQCC0IIKVDCCCrgCAQEXADAPBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGgAgQAoII HCCANkwgBVBAADTJUUUY4gR292ZXJubWVudDENMAAGA1UECXMDR09ENQwwCgYDVQC SDAVBGNVBAATJUUUY4gR29ZZXJubWVudDENMAAGA1UECXMDR09ENQwwCgYDVQC SDAVBGNVBAATJUUUY4gR29ZZXJubWVudDENMAAGA1UECXMDR09ENQwWCGYDVQC	NULREYZCSE a Wur ei also YR32 AONR also X R1 bex R1 19 Ld 3 ggg(Y H1 E B LA z 1 U WG YH z G G MA E C W J W Z 9 J C M W K D M LO LM R D Z E U S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J T M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K S SU YZ 9 L J M K S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K J S SU YZ 9 L J M K S S	>

Figure 17. Import Certificate



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OCSP Configuration

To support the DoD implementation of OCSP, it is necessary to create a different Trustpoint for the OCSP responders and to configure OCSP rules under the DoD Root Trustpoint. The OCSP Responder Trustpoint allows the DoD PKI certificates to be validated against the DoD's self-signed OCSP responders. The OCSP rules instruct the ASA to search in a nonstandard location for the OCSP responder.

Group Matching

To choose the correct certificates for the OCSP overrides, certificate group matching rules must be created. To create the rule, first browse to VPN > IKE > Certificate Group Matching > Rules. Click Add and choose a name as in Figure 18. There is no need to select a Group under the Mapped to Group dialog.

Figure 18. Certificate Matching Rule Name

🖆 Add Certificate Matching Rule				
Configure a certificate matching rule and associate it with a group. The rule priority uniquely identifies the certificate matching rule and assigns a priority to the rule with lower values having greater priority. Rules that are not mapped will be ignored.				
Мар:	C Existing	DefaultCertificateMap 😽		
	 New 	DOD		
Rule Priority:	10			
Mapped to Group:	Not Mapped	~		
ок	Can	cel Help		

Next, click on the newly highlighted Add Button to define the Rule. Create the rule so that it reads Field = "Subject," Component = "Whole Field," Operator = "Contains" and Value = "DOD" as in Figure 19.



🔤 Add Certificate /	Watching Rule Cri	iterion		X
Configure a certificate m	atching rule criterion			
_	10			
Rule Priority:				
Mapped to Group:	Not Mapped			
Field	Component	Operator	Value	
Subject 💌 Wh	ole Field	Contains	DOD	
	ок	Cancel	elp	

Trustpoint Configuration

Create a Trustpoint for the OCSP responder's certificate (Figure 20). Use the same process used earlier for creating a new Trustpoint. Be sure to choose no revocation checking, as the self-signed certificate will not provide a CRL for itself (Figure 21).

Figure 20. OCSP Trustpoint

🖆 Add Trustpoint (Configuration	
Trustpoint Name:	JITC-OCSP	
	-signed certificate on enrollment nabled, only Key Pair and Certificate Parameters can be specified.	
Enrollment Settings	Revocation Check CRL Retrieval Policy CRL Retrieval Method OCSP Rules Advanced	
Key Pair:	DOD-PKI Show Details New Key Pair	
Challenge Password:	Confirm Challenge Password:	
Enrollment Mode	can only be specified if there are no certificates associated with this trustpoint.	
	nual enrollment comatic enrollment	
Enrollmen	t URL: http://	
Retry Per	iod: 1 minutes	
Retry Cou	Int: 0 (Use 0 to indicate unlimited retries)	
	Certificate Parameters	
	OK Cancel Help	

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Figure 21. OCSP Trustpoint Revocation Checking

Add Trustpoint Co	nfiguration				
Trustpoint Name:	JITC-OCSP				
Generate a self-signal	-		eters can be specified.		
Enrollment Settings	Revocation Check	CRL Retrieval Policy	CRL Retrieval Method	OCSP Rules	Advanced
 Do not check 	certificates for revo	ocation			
O Check certific	cates for revocation				
Revocation	Methods				_
			and their order. If both n	nethods are	
selected, t	the second method v	will be used only if th	e first one returns error.		
CRL		Add >>		Move Up	
OCSP		Auu		move op	
	<	< Remove		Move Down	
Consider	certificate valid if re	vocation checking re	turns errors		
	01				
	ОК	Cancel	Help		

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After the OCSP Responder's certificate is installed, return to the DoD Root Trustpoint configuration screens and add a new OCSP Rule (Figure 22). The Rule will need to match the DoD PKI

certificates (using the Certificate Map created earlier) and point to the OCSP URL for OCSP response checking. Be sure to use the OCSP Trustpoint as the Trustpoint for the OCSP Rule (Figure 23). Also, be sure to repeat the OCSP configuration for both DoD Root Trustpoints.

ertificate Map:	DOD
ustpoint :	JITC-OCSP
ex:	10
L:	http://ocsp.nsn0.rcvs.nit_disa.mil

Figure 22. New OSCP Rule



🖆 Edit Trustpoint Config	guration		×		
Generate a self-signer	-Root d certificate on enrollment d, only Key Pair and Certificate Paran	neters can be specified.			
Enrollment Settings Rev	ocation Check CRL Retrieval Policy	CRL Retrieval Method OCSP Rules Advanced	L		
Specify the OCSP or	Specify the OCSP certificate matching rules. OCSP Rules				
Certificate Map		ndex URL Add			
DOD	JITC-OCSP 10	http://ocs			
		Delete			
(OK Cancel	Help			

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AAA Configuration

AAA consists of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting. Since the Authentication is being done with PKI certificates, only the Authorization and Accounting require additional configurations.

This implementation guide does not include accounting configuration. For Authorization, we will use the LDAP protocol to connect to the Active Directory to check the UPN.

LDAP Groups

The first step is to choose the Configuration Tab in ASDM, and choose Properties > AAA Setup (see Figure 24) and add a new AAA Server Group. Choose LDAP, accept the defaults, and hit OK to add the LDAP Group (see Figure 25). Once the LDAP group is configured, add a new server entry for each Domain Controller (DC) that should be queried. It is advisable to add multiple DCs in case one is not available.

-								
Elle Options To	ools <u>W</u> izards <u>H</u> elp					Search: b		Find
est Home	Configuration Monitoring	Bac	k Forward Pa	cket Tracer Ref	esh Save	? Help		
	Configuration > Properties			roups				
	Startup Wizard		AAA Server Groups					
Interfaces	AAA Setup		AAA server groups					
<u>R</u>	Auth. Prompt			Protocol		Deservice Made		
<u> </u>	LDAP Attribute N	12	Server Group	LOCAL	Accounting Mode	e Reactivation Mode	Add	
Security Policy	Anti-Spoofing		ACS	RADIUS	Single	Depletion	Edit	
24	Auto Update			10.000	longo	Dobioni		
NAT							Delete	
~	😑 🚰 Certificate							
<u> </u>	Authentication		<			>		
VPN	Import Certificate							
۵	😽 Key Pair		Servers in the selecte	d group				
IPS I	Manage Certifica	¢ 👘	Server Name or IP A	ddress Interface		Timeout	Add	٦
	Trustpoint Device Access	Ξ						-
<u>A</u>	B B Device Administratio	n					Edit	
CSD Manager	🕀 🚰 DHCP Services						Delete	
124	😑 😹 DNS							
428	DNS Client						Move Up	
Routing	Failover						Move Down	
<u>8</u>	- Fragment							
Global Objects	History Metrics						Test	
-	HTTP/HTTPS							
3	B Dogging							
Properties	Priority Queue							
	SSL							
	TCP Options							
	Timeouts	~			Apply	Reset		
	< >							
	,			<admir< td=""><td>⊳ 15</td><td>😡 🛃 🔂</td><td>5/9/06 12:06:4</td><td>40 PM C</td></admir<>	⊳ 15	😡 🛃 🔂	5/9/06 12:06:4	40 PM C
3p021/a/ppt								

Figure 24. AAA Server Groups

Figure 25. LDAP Server Group

📧 Edit AAA Server Gro	ир 🔀				
	Configure AAA server group. The Accounting Mode attribute is only applicable for RADIUS and TACACS+ protocols.				
Server Group:	AD-LDAP				
Protocol:	LDAP				
Accounting Mode:	Simultaneous				
Reactivation Mode:	Depletion O Timed				
Dead Time	: 10 minutes				
Max Failed Attempts:	3				
ок	Cancel Help				

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The LDAP server settings include the IP address of the server, TCP port, server types, the BaseDN for searching, and other fields. These fields will correspond to the fields in Active Directory. To determine the best entries for the field, use an LDAP browser to browse Active Directory as shown in Figure 3. The descriptions for these fields are outlined in Table 1.

Table	1.	LDAP	Fields

	1	
Field	Value	Description
Interface	Interface Name	Indicates the ASA interface that should be used to contact the server.
Server Name or IP Address	DNS or IP Address	Address of an AD Server.
Timeout	Seconds	Amount of time for the ASA to wait for a response from the server.
Server Port	TCP Port	TCP port used to connect to server.
Server Type	Microsoft	Indicates that this is an MS LDAP server.
BaseDN	LDAP DN	This is the search base for the LDAP query. The ASA will use this as the base of the search for the attribute. This is where all of the users should be located. If users are in multiple AD OUs, then this should be the top-level OU. Use an LDAP browser to determine the best entry.
Scope	Number of Levels to Search	This setting indicates whether the ASA should search one level below the BaseDN or scan the whole tree below the BaseDN. If all users are in the same AD OU, then one level should be chosen. If users are in multiple OUs, then choose subtree. Searching one level will be much quicker than searching the subtree.
LoginDN	User Name for ASA to Use to Scan LDAP	This user ID must be defined in AD with a username and password. It must have rights to read all OUs in the AD that need to be scanned for user data. It should be denied login access, etc., as necessary to ensure it is not used maliciously. Also, be sure to use the entire LDAP Distinguished Name in this field instead of the AD UPN or SAN.
Login Password	Password for ASA AD Account	Password used to access AD. It is currently stored using reversible encryption. This is the primary reason that the user ID for ASA should have minimal rights in the AD.
Attribute Map	Map Name	The LDAP Attribute Map function allows proprietary Cisco LDAP values to be mapped to Microsoft values in AD (or standard LDAP values). It is a powerful feature that will allow the use of AD to define Group Policy and access rights to ASA VPN users. It is discussed in the next section.
Security Checkboxes	Various Security Parameters	Check with the AD administrators to determine which security settings are required to securely access the AD via LDAP.

The AAA Server Entry for the Active Directory LDAP access is illustrated in Figure 26.

🖆 Edit AAA Server	Σ
Server Group:	AD-LDAP
Interface Name:	inside 👱
Server Name or IP Address:	ad1.cisco.dod.mil
Timeout:	10 seconds
LDAP Parameters	
Enable LDAP over SSL	
Server Port:	389
Server Type:	Microsoft 🗸
Base DN:	CN=Users,DC=cisco,DC=dod,DC=mil
Scope:	One level beneath the Base DN
Naming Attribute(s):	userPrincipalName
Login DN:	ACSUser
Login Password:	ci\$co123
LDAP Attribute Map	AD-LDAP
SASL plain authentication	SASL MD5 authentication
SASL Kerberos authentication	n
Kerberos Server Group:	
ок	Cancel Help

Figure	26.	LDAP	Server	Entry
--------	-----	------	--------	-------

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LDAP Attribute Map

As stated earlier, the LDAP Attribute Map allows for the ASA to pull proprietary or standard LDAP attributes from an Active Directory and convert them to proprietary Cisco LDAP attributes. Prior to version 7.2, the ASA used legacy, proprietary LDAP attributes from the Cisco VPN 3000. In order to use LDAP with the VPN3000, customers were required to extend their LDAP schema to accommodate these attributes. The LDAP attribute map eliminates this dependency. For a complete list of legacy VPN3000 LDAP attributes, refer to

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806 3b318.html#wp1546973.

Allow Dial-In

To configure the ASA to check the dial-in attribute assigned in Active Directory, create a new LDAP Attribute Map and map the Cisco Name cVPN3000-Tunneling-Protocols to the Customer Name msNPAllowDialin as in Figure 27. Next, map the values returned by msNPAllowDialin (TRUE or FALSE) to the values required by cVPN3000-Tunneling-Protocols (20 or 1) as in Figure 28.

Figure 27. LDAP Attribute Map Name

lap Name Map Value				
			Customer Name msNPAllowDialin	Cisco Name cVPN3000-Tunneling-Protocols
Customer Name:]	Add >>		
cVPN3000-Access-Hours	•			

Figure 28. LDAP Attribute Map Values

Dial-In Values

Name: AD-LDAP Map Name Map Value		
Map Name Map Value	Customer to Cisco Map Value	
msNPAllowDialin	TRUE=20 FALSE=1	Add
		Edit
		Delete
ſ	OK Cancel Help	

Access to the ASA VPN will now be controlled by this AD parameter and is summarized in Table 2.

Dial-In Dialog	msNPAllowDialin Value	cVPN3000-Tunneling-Protocol Value
Allow Access	True	20
Deny Access	False	1
Control Access Through RAS Policy	N/A (not sent)	Set by ASA Group Policy

The value assigned to cVPN3000-Tunneling-Protocol indicates which protocols can be used. Setting this value to 20 allows all protocols (IPSec, WebVPN, L2TP/IPSec). For a complete description of these values, check

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products configuration guide chapter09186a00806 3b318.html#wp1546973.

Table 2.

External Group Policies

Any values in Active Directory can be remapped via LDAP Attribute Mapping. ASA External Group Policies can also be defined in AD and mapped to ASA settings. The ASA obtains the value for the External Group that should be used for the user from the user record. ASA then performs a separate LDAP query for a Username corresponding to the External Group. This requires configuring a User ID in Active Directory that is used as a template for the External Group settings.

Note: These accounts should be configured in Active Directory so that a rogue user will not have access to these accounts.

The advantage is that changes to the External Group policy only need to happen once. Internal Groups can also be defined in the ASA and individual values set in AD for each user to override the Internal Group settings (as shown in the Allow Dial-In example). With External Groups, all changes can be made in AD and the user record only needs to reflect which template user to query for the settings.

In this example, we are defining an External Group Policy and mapping it to settings in the Active Directory. The chosen AD fields are not mandatory. Any fields could be used to define the values. The settings pulled from AD are the IPSec Banner (cVPN3000-IPSec-Banner1) and the Idle Timeout (cVPN3000-IETF-RADIUS-Session-Timeout).

First, create a template user in AD that will contain the settings (see Figure 29). We chose the UPN VPNUserGroup and decided to use Description for the IPSec Banner and Office for the Idle Timer.

NUserGroup Prope	rties		?
Member Of	Dial-in En	vironment	Sessions
Remote control	Terminal Serv	ices Profile	COM+
General Address	Account Profile	Telephones	Organization
VPNUse	rGroup		
<u>F</u> irst name:	VPNUserGroup	Initials:	
Last name:			
Di <u>s</u> play name:	VPNUserGroup		
Description:	Group used to define	RA VPN setting	s
Office:	2		
Telephone number:			Other
E-mail:			
Web page:			Other
<u>w</u> eo page.	1		oungin
	OK	Cancel	Apply

Figure 29. External Group Template User

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Any other AD values (telephone number, email, etc.) could also be used on the Template User. They do not have to correspond in any way to the values normally used in the AD environment. To determine what the values are, use an LDAP browser to scan the Template User. Next, alter the individual user records to indicate which External Group Policy will be used. This will need to match exactly the Template User UPN. We chose Department, as it seemed like a good indicator of which group the user may belong to (see Figure 30).

ad Woolwine	l Properties	?
Member Of	Dial-in Environment	Sessions
Remote co General Ac	ntrol Terminal Services Profile dress Account Profile Telepho	
<u>T</u> itle:		
Department:	VPNUserGroup	
Company:		
_ Manager —	1	
_		
<u>N</u> ame:	I	
	Change Properties	Cjear
Direct reports:		
Dil <u>e</u> ct reports.		
	OK Canc	

Figure 30. User Record Referencing Template User

153p027/a/ppt

The ASA configuration involves creating an LDAP Attribute Map to map the values. The LDAP values that need to be mapped are illustrated in Figure 31. No Map Values need to be assigned, as the user will use the values as they appear in the Active Directory. Browsing the LDAP structure will reveal what each attribute is called in AD. The list of Cisco proprietary attribute names can be found at

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products configuration guide chapter09186a00806 3b318.html#wp1546973.

Name: AD-LDAP
Customer Name Cisco Name physicaDeliveryOfficeName cVPN3000-IETF-Radius-Session department cVPN3000-IETF-Radius-Ciass description cVPN3000-IPSec-Banner1 Add >>
Cisco Name: cVPN3000-JPSec-Banner1
OK Cancel Help

Figure 31. External Group Policy LDAP Attribute Map

Assign the LDAP Attribute Map to the LDAP entry shown in Figure 26. Any entries not defined in the Active Directory will be pulled from the Default Group Policy.

Remote Access VPN Configuration

ASA Configuration

Tunnel Group

The parameters for Remote Access Connections are configured in Tunnel Groups. To create a Tunnel Group to support CAC authentication, choose VPN > General > Tunnel Group and add a new Tunnel Group. The Basic settings can use the Default Group Policy or another Group Policy as needed.

On the General > Advanced Tab, choose anything for authentication (see Figure 32). This controls which AAA group will be used for Extended Authentication (Xauth). This configuration cannot use Xauth, so the settings do not matter.

Edit Tunr	el Group							2
Name:	DODPKIR	AVPN		Туре:	ipsec-ra			
General	IPSec PPP							
Config	ure general acce	ess attributes fro	m the follow	ing sub-	tabs.			
Basic	Authentication	Authorization	Accounting	Client	Address Assignmen	Advanced		
To s	et authentication	i server group p	er interface,	go to the	e Advanced tab.			
Aut	hentication Serv	er Group:	LOCAL		~			
	Use LOCA	L if Server Grou	up fails					
Ne	C Authentication	Samuer Cranmi	None -		~			
NA	. Authentication	Server Group:	None -					
U								1
		ок		Can	cel I	lelp		

Figure 32. Tunnel Group Authentication

153p035/a/ppt

For Authorization, choose the Active Directory LDAP Group and specify UPN as the Primary DN Field as shown in Figure 33.

Note: UPN is not supported in this release of ASDM but is available at the command line. See Appendix A for the command line syntax.

Figure 33. Tunnel Group Authorization

🖆 Edit Tunnel Group
Name: DODPK/RAVPN Type: insec-ra
General IPSec PPP Configure general access attributes from the following sub-tabs. Basic Authentication Authorization Authorization Authorization Accounting Olient Address Assignment Authorization Server Group: AD-LDAP V Users must exist in the authorization database to connect
Authorization Settings Use the entire DN as the username Specify individual DN fields as the username Primary DN Field: CN (Common Name) Secondary DN Field: OU (Organization Unit)
OK Cancel Help

153p036/a/ppt

Next, browse to the IPSec tab and choose the Trustpoint name that contains the ASA certificate (see Figure 34). Choose none from the Authentication mode drop-down list to disable Xauth. IKE Peer ID Validation must be required as that enables certificate authentication. The ASA must be configured to send the certificate chain, or the VPN Client may fail the connection. The remaining parameters are optional.

Name: DODPKIRAVPN		Type:	ipsec-ra			
eneral IPSec ppp						
Pre-shared Key:		Trueto	oint Name:	JITC-CA7	~	
Authentication Mode: none			er ID Validation:			
	×	IKE PO	er ID Validation:	Required		
Enable sending certificate chair ISAKMP Keepalive	n					
O Disable keepalives						
Monitor keepalives						
Confidence Interval	300	(second	e) Retry I	nterval: 2	(seconds)	
Contractice interval.		(Second	is) iteliyi	iller val.	(Seconds)	
O Head end will never initiate		nitoring	Interface	A	uthentication Mode	1
Interface-Specific Authentication		1>>	Interface	A	uthentication Mode	2
Interface-Specific Authentication Interface: Imm Authentication Mode: Imm	Mode Add	1>>	Interface	A	uthentication Mode	~
Interface-Specific Authentication Interface: denz Authentication Mode: none	Mode Add	1>>		A mage URL	uthentication Mode	
Interface-Specific Authentication Interface: dmz Authentication Mode: none	Mode Add	i>> move			uthentication Mode	
Interface-Specific Authentication Interface: dmz Authentication Mode: none Client VPN Software Update Table Client Type Al Windows Platforms Windows Platforms	Mode Add	i>> move			uthentication Mode	
Interface-Specific Authentication Interface: dmz Authentication Mode: none	Mode Add	i>> move			uthentication Mode	

Figure 34. Tunnel Group Authorization IPSec Tab

Group Policies

Minimal changes need to be made to the Default Group Policy. (See Figure 35.) The Default Group Policy will apply to all Tunnel Groups and subsequent Group Policies. The values configured can be overridden in the individual polices. Examples of items that may be desirable to enter are Domain Name Servers (DNS), Split Tunneling Polices, Address Pools, etc. (See Figure 36.)

Name: DfttGrpPolicy	
eneral IPSec Client Config	uration Client Firewall Hardware Client NAC WebVPN
Tunneling Protocols:	VIPSec VWebVPN VL2TP over IPSec
Filter:	None Manage
Connection Settings	
Access Hours:	Unrestricted Manage
Simultaneous Logins:	3
Maximum Connect Time:	Unlimited minutes
Idle Timeout:	Unlimited 30 minutes
Servers	
DNS Servers:	Primary: 10.10.100.2 Secondary:
WINS Servers:	Primary: Secondary:
DHCP Scope:	10.10.200.0

Figure 35. Default Group Policy General Settings

Figure 36. Default Group Policy Client Tab

Name:	DfltGrpPolicy						
General	Sec Client Confi	guration Client Firewa	all Har	lware Client	NAC	WebVPN	
General	Client Parameters	Cisco Client Paramete	ers Mic	rosoft Client	Parame	ters	
Bann	er:		(Edit Ba	nner	
Defa	uit Domain:		[cisco.dod.mil	1		
Split 1	funnel DNS Names	(space delimited):					
Split	Tunnel Policy:		[funnel All Nel	tworks	×	
Split	funnel Network Lis	t:		- None	¥	Manage	
Add	ess pools						
	Available Pools			Assig	gned Po	ools (up to 6 entries)	
	vpnpool		Add>>				

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Internet Key Exchange

Next, define the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) settings.

Global Parameters

The IKE Policy (see Figure 37) defines how to set up Phase 1 of IPSec. To add a new IKE Policy, choose VPN > IKE > Policies and click Add. Define the desired parameters for encryption, hash, Diffie-Hellman Exchange, and key lifetime. For certificate exchange, rsa-sig authentication is required.

Figure 37. IKE Policy

🖆 Edit IKE Polic	2 y		
Priority:	10	Authentication:	rsa-sig 🔽
Encryption:	aes-256 💌	D-H Group:	5 🗸
Hash:	sha 💌	Lifetime:	Unlimited 86400 seconds
	ок	Cancel	Help

153p029/a/ppt

Once an IKE policy is defined, it must be enabled on an interface. Choose IKE > Global Parameters and enable IKE on each desired interface. (See Figure 38.) Additional parameters include enabling NAT-T and setting several options for security and client notification. Use Automatic Identity for CAC integration.



Figure 38. Globally Enabling Internet Key Exchange

153p030/a/ppt

Certificate Group Matching

When a certificate is presented, the ASA must know which Tunnel Group to associate with the certificate. By default, the ASA will try to match any field in the OU Field in the Certificate with a Tunnel Group. For best results, this can be overridden by browsing to IKE > Certificate Group Matching > Policy. Uncheck all of the options except the Default. From the drop down choose the Tunnel Group created earlier (see Figure 39).

Figure 39. Tunnel Group Association



IPSec Configuration

IPSec rules define which traffic should be encrypted. To define "interesting" traffic for IPSec, create an IPSec rule by browsing to VPN > IPSec > IPSec Rules and hitting Add. Choose the Interface, users will be connecting. For remote access, the Policy Type should be dynamic. Priority is configurable. If multiple IPSec rules exist, they are processed based on priority. If this is the first IPSec Rule, it is desirable to choose a priority higher than 1 so that other IPSec rules can be inserted later. (See Figure 40.)

Next, choose one or more Transform Sets to be added. The priority of the transport set can be moved up or down as needed. Additional transform sets can also be defined, but the default sets are typically satisfactory for most installations. Peer Settings should be blank for Remote Access. Perfect Forward Secrecy provides higher security for the IPSec tunnel but is very costly in performance.

l Policy (Crypto Map) - Basic 👖	unnel Policy (Crypto Ma	o) - Advanced	Traffic Selection	1
nterface: outside 🔽	Policy Type	dynamic	~	Priority: 10
Transform Sets		SP-AES-256-S		
Transform Set to Be Added:	Add >>		na -	Move Up
ESP-AES-192-MD5	Remove			Move Down
	Remove			
used for LAN-to-LAN redundant				
The Connection Type is applicate used for LANA-CAN redundant redundant peers.	cy. Tunnel policies of th			
used for LAN-to-LAN redundant redundant peers.	ey. Tunnel policies of th			e may specify up to 10
used for LAN-to-LAN redundant redundant peers.	cy. Tunnel policies of th Add >> Remove			e may specify up to 10

Figure 40. IPSec Rule Creation

153p031/a/ppt

The Advanced tab contains options for Security Association Lifetime, NAT-T, and Reverse Route Injection, which are optional components.

The Traffic Selection tab defines that the traffic should be encrypted by the tunnel and is required. (See Figure 41.)

Figure 41. IPSec Traffic Assignment

	ap) - Basic Tunnel Policy (Crypto Map) - Ad	vanced Traff	ic Selection
Interface and Action				
Interface: outside	~	Acti	on: 🖌 Prote	t 💙
Source			Destination	
Type: 🧇 any		~	Type:	📲 IP Address 🛛 👻
			IP Address:	10.10.200.0 🗸
			Netmask:	255.255.255.0
Protocol and Service				
Rule Flow Diagram	any -		outside	10.10.200.0/24
Rule Flow Diagram			* ,	10.10.200.0/24
			* ,	10.10.200.0/24
Options Time Range: (any)			* ,	10.10.200.0/24



Cisco VPN Client Configuration

The VPN Client contains minimal user configuration options (see Figure 42). The majority of the options are configured on the ASA and pushed down to the client. All that is required on the client is choosing which destination to initiate a tunnel and which credentials to use. The client also has the ability to choose which TCP or UDP ports should be used, backup servers, or whether to initiate a dial-up session.

Graphical User Interface Configuration

First, click new to create a new connection for the ASA. Fill out a name for the entry, description, and IP Address or DNS of the outside interface of the ASA. If using DNS, ensure it is resolvable externally. For CAC, choose Certificate Authentication and select the check box for Send CA Certificate Chain. The Certificate Name can be left blank. The user will need to choose a certificate the first time the client is launched. The Transport, Backup Servers, and Dial-Up tabs should be configured as needed.

Figure 42. Cisco VPN Client Configuration

VPN Client Properties for "ASA"	
Connection Entry: ASA	200
Host 132.168.1.17	
	p Authentication
Password: Confirm Password:	
Certificate Authentication Name:	
Sgnd CA Certificate Chain	
Erase User Password	Cancel

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When CACs are inserted in a reader, the Middleware presents the certificates to the system via the Microsoft CAPI. The VPN client queries CAPI when launched and presents all of the certificates available in the User Store. The Certificates Tab will display all of the certificates available to the user (Figure 43).



	mport Export		Verify Delete		Cisco Syste
Connection Entrie	s Certificates Certificate	Log	Store 🛆	Key Size	Validity
)	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.6.1160082069	Microsoft	1024	until Feb 9, 2007 17:59:59
1	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.6.1160082069	Microsoft	1024	until Feb 9, 2007 17:59:59
2	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.LEWIS.128803	9573 Microsoft	1024	until Jun 30, 2006 18:59:59
3	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.1.1160082018	Microsoft	1024	until Feb 8, 2007 17:59:59
1	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.1.1160082018	Microsoft	1024	until Feb 8, 2007 17:59:59
5	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.LEWIS.128803	9573 Microsoft	1024	until Jun 30, 2006 18:59:59
6	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.LEWIS.128803	9573 Microsoft	1024	until Jun 30, 2006 18:59:59
7	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.6.1160082069	Microsoft	1024	until Feb 9, 2007 17:59:59
3	WOOLWINE.C	CHAD.1.1160082018	Microsoft	1024	until Feb 8, 2007 17:59:59

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Using Profile Files

All of the information for the connection is stored in the \Program Files\Cisco Systems\VPN Client\Profiles directory on the workstation. Each connection profile is stored in a .pcf text file with various elements. Template profiles can be created and deployed to pre-configure workstations. Details on deployment options for the VPN Client can be found at

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps2308/products_administration_guide_book09_186a00802d5d97.html.

One limitation of the Cisco VPN Client is that it does not display the Friendly Name field on the certificate. This problem can prevent the user from knowing which of the three certificates to choose. Fortunately, there are a couple of options in the profile that allow for automatic selection of the proper certificate. The fields are CertMatchKU and CertMatchDN. By setting them to the values

shown in the following configuration, the VPN Client will choose the signature certificate when sending authentication information to the ASA. The user does not need to select a certificate at any point during authentication. For best results, the .PCF files should be pre-installed on workstations before the user attempts to log on. There is also a field available called CertMatchEKU, but use of this field has provided inconsistent results.

[main] Description=CAC Connection to ASA Host=192.168.1.17 AuthType=3 !Username= !UserPassword= !CertSubjectName= !CertSerialHash= !CertSerialHash= !CertMatchKU=7,8 CertMatchDN=issuer-cn*"EMAIL" SendCertChain=1 CertStore=2"

WebVPN Configuration

Most of the building blocks used for Remote Access VPN will also be used for WebVPN connections. This section will detail the basics of configuring WebVPN to support the CAC. Further configuration information for WebVPN can be found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806 http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806

Enable SSL User Certificate Exchange

To enable WebVPN CAC integration, the outside (or VPN facing) interface needs to require certificates for user Hypertext Transfer Protocol/Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTP/HTTPS) connections. To enable this requirement, choose Properties > HTTP/HTTPS and edit the proper interfaces as in Figure 44.

Figure 44. Required Certificates for HTTPS



153p040/a/ppt

Group Policies

The Default Group Policy has already been configured and does not need to be changed to accommodate basic CAC Authentication. However, there are optional settings that should be configured to enhance the end-user experience.

Tunnel Group

Using the Default WebVPN Tunnel Group, click the Authorization Tab. Choose the Active Directory LDAP AAA Group and choose UPN as the primary Authorization field as shown in Figure 45.

Note: UPN is not supported in this release of ASDM but is available at the command line. UPN is supported in ASDM version 5.2.1.54 or later. See Appendix A for the command line syntax.

Figure 45. WebVPN Authorization Settings

Name: Default/VEBVPNGro	up Type: webvpn
Name. Deraditvice v Prioro	ob Type webshi
General WebVPN	
Configure general access attribut	
Basic Authentication Authoriza	tion Accounting Client Address Assignment Advanced
Authorization Server Group:	AD-LDAP
	he authorization database to connect
-Authorization Settings	
O Use the entire DN as the	e username
 Specify individual DN fie 	lids as the username
Primary DN Field:	CN (Common Name)
Secondary DN Field:	None Y

Next, browse to the WebVPN > Basic tab and choose Certificate Authentication (see Figure 46).

🐱 Edit Tunnel Group
Name: DefaultVEBVPNGroup Type: webvpn General WebVPN
Configure WebVPN access attributes from the following sub-tabs.
Basic NetBIOS Servers Croup Aliases and URLs Web Page Authentication: O AAA O Certificate O Both
DNS Group: DefaultDNS
Specify an alternate group policy, in case the general attributes group policy fails the CSD host integrity check.
CSD Failure Group Policy. DtttGrpPolicy
OK Cancel Help

Figure 46. WebVPN Certificate Authentication

153p042/a/ppt
Optional Components

Additional WebVPN components that can be added are the Cisco Secure Desktop and the SSL VPN Client. Details on configuring these components can be found at

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00806 3b194.html.

Acronyms

Acronyms	
AD	Active Directory
API	Application Programming Interface
ASA	Adaptive Security Appliance
ASDM	Adaptive Security Device Manager
CA	Certification Authority
CAC	Common Access Card
CAPI	Certificate Application Programming Interface
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
DC	Domain Controller
DN	Distinguished Name
DoD	Department of Defense
EKU	Enhanced Key Usage
GUI	Graphical User Interface
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
IP	Internet Protocol
IPSec	Internet Protocol Security
ISO	International Standards Organization
KU	Key Usage
L2TP	Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
OS	Operating System
OU	Organizational Unit
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PMO	Program Management Organization
PN	Principal Name
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Servers	
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman
SAN	Subject Alternative Name

- SSH Secure Shell
- SSL Secure Socket Layer
- TCP Transmission Control Protocol
- UPN User Principal Name
- URL Uniform Resource Location
- VPN Virtual Private Network

```
Appendix A – ASA CLI Configuration
ASA Version 7.2(1)0
!
hostname asa
domain-name cisco.dod.mil
enable password 2KFQnbNldl.2KYOU encrypted
names
name 10.10.100.2 ad1.cisco.dod.mil description Domain Controller
dns-guard
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
nameif inside
security-level 100
ip address 10.10.200.2 255.255.255.0
ļ
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
nameif dmz
security-level 75
ip address 192.168.80.1 255.255.255.0
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
nameif guest
security-level 25
ip address 192.168.90.1 255.255.255.0
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/3
nameif outside
security-level 0
ip address dhcp setroute
!
interface Management0/0
shutdown
```

no nameif no security-level no ip address ! passwd 2KFQnbNIdI.2KYOU encrypted boot system disk0:/cdisk.chad2 ftp mode passive clock timezone CST -6 clock summer-time CDT recurring dns domain-lookup inside dns domain-lookup outside dns server-group DefaultDNS name-server ad1.cisco.dod.mil domain-name cisco.dod.mil access-list inside_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 10.10.0.0 255.255.0.0 192.168.80.0 255.255.255.0 access-list inside_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 10.10.0.0 255.255.0.0 10.10.200.0 255.255.255.0 access-list inside_nat0_outbound extended permit ip any 10.10.200.48 255.255.255.240 access-list dmz_access_in extended permit udp 192.168.80.0 255.255.255.0 host ad1.cisco.dod.mil eq domain access-list dmz_access_in extended deny ip any 10.10.0.0 255.255.0.0 access-list dmz_access_in extended permit ip 192.168.80.0 255.255.255.0 any access-list outside_cryptomap_65535.10 extended permit ip any any access-list dmz_cryptomap extended permit ip any 10.10.200.48 255.255.255.240 pager lines 24 logging enable logging monitor debugging logging asdm informational mtu inside 1500 mtu dmz 1500 mtu guest 1500 mtu outside 1500

Design Guide

ip local pool vpnpool 10.10.200.50-10.10.200.60 mask 255.255.255.0 no failover asdm image disk0:/asdm521.bin no asdm history enable arp timeout 14400 nat-control global (outside) 1 interface nat (inside) 0 access-list inside_nat0_outbound nat (inside) 1 10.10.0.0 255.255.0.0 dns nat (dmz) 1 192.168.80.0 255.255.255.0 dns access-group dmz_access_in in interface dmz route inside 10.10.0.0 255.255.0.0 10.10.200.1 1 timeout xlate 3:00:00 timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02 timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00 timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00 timeout uauth 0:05:00 absolute Idap attribute-map AD-LDAP map-name msNPAllowDialin cVPN3000-Tunneling-Protocols map-value msNPAllowDialin FALSE 1 map-value msNPAllowDialin TRUE 20 aaa-server ACS protocol radius aaa-server ACS host 10.10.100.3 key cisco aaa-server AD protocol kerberos aaa-server AD host ad1.cisco.dod.mil kerberos-realm CISCO.DOD.MIL aaa-server AD-LDAP protocol Idap aaa-server AD-LDAP host ad1.cisco.dod.mil Idap-base-dn CN=Users,DC=cisco,DC=dod,DC=mil Idap-scope onelevel Idap-naming-attribute userPrincipalName

Idap-login-password ci\$co123

Idap-login-dn cn=ACSUser,cn=Users,dc=cisco,dc=dod,dc=mil

server-type microsoft

Idap-attribute-map AD-LDAP

aaa-server IAS protocol radius

aaa-server IAS host 10.10.100.6

key cisco

aaa-server AD-LDAP-2 protocol Idap

aaa-server AD-LDAP-2 host ad1.cisco.dod.mil

Idap-base-dn cn=Users,dc=cisco,dc=dod,dc=mil

Idap-scope onelevel

Idap-naming-attribute userPrincipalName

Idap-login-password ci\$co123

Idap-login-dn cn=ACSUser,cn=Users,dc=cisco,dc=dod,dc=mil

server-type microsoft

Idap-attribute-map AD-LDAP

group-policy DfltGrpPolicy attributes

banner value Use of this DoD computer system, authorized or unauthorized, constitutes consent to monitoring of this system. Unauthorized use may subject you to criminal prosecution. Evidence of unauthorized use collected during monitoring may be used for administrative, criminal, or other adverse action. Use of this system constitutes consent to monitoring for these purposes.

wins-server none

dns-server value 10.10.100.2

dhcp-network-scope 10.10.200.0

vpn-access-hours none

vpn-simultaneous-logins 3

vpn-idle-timeout 30

vpn-session-timeout none

vpn-filter none

vpn-tunnel-protocol IPSec l2tp-ipsec webvpn

password-storage disable

ip-comp disable

re-xauth disable

group-lock none

pfs disable

ipsec-udp enable

ipsec-udp-port 10000

split-tunnel-policy tunnelall

split-tunnel-network-list none

default-domain value cisco.dod.mil

split-dns none

intercept-dhcp 255.255.255.255 disable

secure-unit-authentication disable

user-authentication disable

user-authentication-idle-timeout 30

ip-phone-bypass disable

leap-bypass disable

nem disable

backup-servers keep-client-config

msie-proxy server none

msie-proxy method no-modify

msie-proxy except-list none

msie-proxy local-bypass disable

nac disable

nac-sq-period 300

nac-reval-period 36000

nac-default-acl none

address-pools none

client-firewall none

client-access-rule none

webvpn

functions url-entry

html-content-filter none

homepage none

keep-alive-ignore 4

http-comp gzip

filter none

url-list none

customization value DfltCustomization

port-forward none

port-forward-name value Application Access

sso-server none

deny-message value Login was successful, but because certain criteria have not been met or due to some specific group policy, you do not have permission to use any of the VPN features. Contact your IT administrator for more information

svc none

svc keep-installer installed

svc keepalive none

svc rekey time none

svc rekey method none

svc dpd-interval client none

svc dpd-interval gateway none

svc compression deflate

username WOOLWINE.CHAD.1.1160082018 nopassword

http server enable

http 10.10.100.0 255.255.255.0 inside

http authentication-certificate outside

http redirect outside 80

no snmp-server location

no snmp-server contact

snmp-server enable traps snmp authentication linkup linkdown coldstart

crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-AES-256-SHA esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac

crypto dynamic-map outside_dyn_map 10 match address outside_cryptomap_65535.10

crypto dynamic-map outside_dyn_map 10 set transform-set ESP-AES-256-SHA

crypto dynamic-map outside_dyn_map 10 set nat-t-disable

crypto dynamic-map dmz_dyn_map 20 set transform-set ESP-AES-256-SHA

crypto map outside_map 65535 ipsec-isakmp dynamic outside_dyn_map

crypto map outside_map interface outside

crypto ca trustpoint JITC-OCSP

enrollment terminal

crl configure

crypto ca trustpoint JITC-CA7

revocation-check ocsp none

keypair DOD-PKI

ocsp disable-nonce

ocsp url http://ocsp.nsn0.rcvs.nit.disa.mil

crl configure

crypto ca trustpoint JITC-Root

revocation-check ocsp none

enrollment terminal

keypair DOD-PKI

ocsp disable-nonce

ocsp url http://ocsp.nsn0.rcvs.nit.disa.mil

match certificate DOD override ocsp trustpoint JITC-OCSP 10 url http://ocsp.nsn0.rcvs.nit.disa.mil

crl configure

no enforcenextupdate

no protocol http

no protocol Idap

no protocol scep

crypto ca certificate map DOD 10

subject-name co dod

crypto ca certificate chain JITC-OCSP

certificate ca 00

30820241 308201aa a0030201 02020100 300d0609 2a864886 f70d0101 05050030 4e310b30 09060355 04061302 75733118 30160603 55040a13 0f552e53 2e20476f 7665726e 6d656e74 310c300a 06035504 0b130344 6f443117 30150603 55040313 0e524356 53204a49 5443204f 43535030 1e170d30 35303132 35323133 3330345a 170d3038 30333135 32313333 30345a30 4e310b30 09060355 04061302 75733118 30160603 55040a13 0f552e53 2e20476f 7665726e 6d656e74 310c300a 06035504 0b130344 6f443117 30150603 55040313 0e524356 53204a49 5443204f 43535030 819f300d 06092a86 4886f70d 01010105 0003818d 00308189 02818100 c111ab66 f65e135e 36a60696 d99b1089 c9945fee 157277c5 6c3281c7 07613394 d8dc98bc 962d20d5 b3447128 cc828b6f 6398361c bb3fdeb7 9f7d0c12 5e9bf948 32b32ef8 7687efdb 9457b600 fdf2538b fa811a9d f2901b92 c7bf97a1 45b906a6 25f8c8d4 d6b19923 4cc0b703 fc7c8f24 3bc69593 860c911a 479c51b8 c9fcaef1 02030100 01a32f30 2d300906 03551d13 04023000 30200603 551d2501 01ff0416 30140608 2b060105 05070301 06082b06 01050507 0309300d 06092a86 4886f70d 01010505 00038181 003a1ad6 07450f06 efb2fba0 8b63a57a 004b5955 7a7c9b08 756bba42 8bd34253 ca224320 8933a9ec 0a8c4a61 ecd7adb7 dec8f7bc 61e1a9cc 2fa71a92 08d946c4 ac11adfd 6a6d1261 c3bd1202 c8b758dd 4932f04e 1dea5ffd fddbbf43 22ef9af2 b693ebc8 5f0753b2 2841f124 ca9f1b5a 043b899d 3da73284 9e2008c1 b25eca32 17

quit

crypto ca certificate chain JITC-CA7

certificate 00ca83

308203e9 30820352 a0030201 02020300 ca83300d 06092a86 4886f70d 01010505 00306331 0b300906 03550406 13025553 31183016 06035504 0a130f55 2e532e20 476f7665 726e6d65 6e74310c 300a0603 55040b13 03444f44 310c300a 06035504 0b130350 4b49311e 301c0603 55040313 15444f44 20434c41 53532033 204a4954 43204341 2d37301e 170d3036 30353039 31363031 32365a17 0d303830 36303230 31343733 385a3074 310b3009 06035504 06130255 53311830 16060355 040a130f 552e532e 20476f76 65726e6d 656e7431 0c300a06 0355040b 1303446f 44310c30 0a060355 040b1303 504b4931 13301106 0355040b 130a434f 4e545241 43544f52 311a3018 06035504 03131161 73612e63 6973636f 2e646f64 2e6d696c 30819f30 0d06092a 864886f7 0d010101 05000381 8d003081 89028181 00891d0e d0f9aada 32cb440c 2b77d735 d8dcbba7 a2697e5b 611df600 e324c390 25235b2e 700296b7 51947e2d 5006c393 615d96b5 d3144a27 89e19247 c2ca6bce e73b919d 9507357f 735fd69c 4851221b 31448d62 f6b2ddff abc0a57e 7a4abb00 38bc73b0 92dfa3fd 71790eac bed39a8b 8a7d6ff6 f2dc9cb1 6b909251 57cd5306 69020301 0001a382 01983082 0194301f 0603551d 23041830 16801483 b4de4b24 56a8376c 2a5bb3ba 94bcbd6c 2e8c3a30 1d060355 1d0e0416 04142bc5 3a352d65 5701af33 3ae0b0d0

05da0fd4 68de300e 0603551d 0f0101ff 04040302 05a03081 aa060355 1d1f0481 a230819f 30819ca0 8199a081 96868193 6c646170 3a2f2f69 6464732e 6e69742e 64697361 2e6d696c 2f636e25 3364444f 44253230 434c4153 53253230 33253230 4a495443 25323043 412d3725 32636f75 25336450 4b492532 636f7525 3364446f 44253263 6f253364 552e532e 25323047 6f766572 6e6d656e 74253263 63253364 55533f63 65727469 66696361 74657265 766f6361 74696f6e 6c697374 3b62696e 61727930 7d060355 1d120476 30748672 6c646170 3a2f2f69 6464732e 6e69742e 64697361 2e6d696c 2f636e25 3364444f 44253230 434c4153 53253230 33253230 4a495443 25323043 412d3725 32636f75 25336450 4b492532 636f7525 3364446f 44253263 6f253364 552e532e 25323047 6f766572 6e6d656e 74253263 63253364 55533016 0603551d 20040f30 0d300b06 09608648 01650201 0b05300d 06092a86 4886f70d 01010505 00038181 002c628c d61abe14 a46c898a 56fb47f6 cd42b20b 12460031 59f9fa38 44cba69c 4ea027c5 8bdd37a3 bc899d36 b7d59aad e4bc3cd0 b9181fc6 0d5598a9 4e1aed0a 88fb7289 036ba680 e6ee811b 277d64f1 77514b7c 46d321d7 ea0e3cea ddd0efe3 43efdae8 90312b11 5e7ebc5a 97fc7528 c8d01ea2 030ccb82 148692c8 9088ff14 ab

quit

certificate ca 45

3082042e 30820397 a0030201 02020145 300d0609 2a864886 f70d0101 05050030 6a310b30 09060355 04061302 55533118 30160603 55040a13 0f552e53 2e20476f 7665726e 6d656e74 310c300a 06035504 0b130344 6f44310c 300a0603 55040b13 03504b49 31253023 06035504 03131c4a 49544320 446f4420 504b4920 436c6173 73203320 526f6f74 20434130 1e170d30 33303630 34303134 3733385a 170d3038 30363032 30313437 33385a30 63310b30 09060355 04061302 55533118 30160603 55040a13 0f552e53 2e20476f 7665726e 6d656e74 310c300a 06035504 0b130344 4f44310c 300a0603 55040b13 03504b49 311e301c 06035504 03131544 4f442043 4c415353 2033204a 49544320 43412d37 30819f30 0d06092a 864886f7 0d010101 05000381 8d003081 89028181 00ad5601 3977626a e7c87150 469974c2 a612adfc ea7e6830 652e79c9 9f010c54 e51eac89 6f13d003 44739349 520248f2 1ceecac9 115fa3d7 876721fd 4bb8aff0 c1e92b82 4a53bdd9 5b8c7c8b 9489816e b07df1ce 7850d60a ec512eee a9746031 5c0e70c8 8bc9eac1 87428f56 4a35c853 a7071ec8 834e6807 cb2789d3 f5a75611 7d020301 0001a382 01e93082 01e5300f 0603551d 130101ff 04053003 0101ff30 1d060355 1d0e0416 041483b4 de4b2456 a8376c2a 5bb3ba94 bcbd6c2e 8c3a300e 0603551d 0f0101ff 04040302 0186300c 0603551d 24040530 03800100 3081b506 03551d1f 0481ad30 81aa3081 a7a081a4 a081a186 819e6c64 61703a2f 2f696464 732e6e69 742e6469 73612e6d 696c2f63 6e253364 4a495443 25323044 6f442532 30504b49 25323043 6c617373 25323033 25323052 6f6f7425 32304341 2532636f 75253364 504b4925 32636f75 25336444 6f442532 636f2533 64552e53 2e253230 476f7665 726e6d65 6e742532 63632533 6455533f 63657274 69666963 61746572 65766f63 6174696f 6e6c6973 743b6269 6e617279 301f0603 551d2304 18301680 146b9ff8 f63db0e8 aa3d88f2 631d20ef dc6c1b77 4e303006 03551d20 04293027 300b0609 60864801 6502010b 05300b06 09608648 01650201 0b09300b 06096086 48016502 010b0a30 81890603 551d1204 8181307f 867d6c64 61703a2f 2f696464 732e6e69 742e6469 73612e6d 696c2f63 6e253364 4a495443 25323044 6f442532 30504b49 25323043 6c617373 25323033 25323052 6f6f7425 32304341 2532636f 75253364 504b4925 32636f75 25336444 6f442532 636f2533 64552e53 2e253230 476f7665 726e6d65 6e742532 63632533 64555330 0d06092a 864886f7 0d010105 05000381 8100afb6 380b4a1d 8e5488f5 0815166c db1030ae 9ae543b5 d638ca10 843fe825 ff60cd24 d566bb28 9cabd8a2 dbd7b599 f3b3d01b 4b610b71 d49e8ea2 3796a6a7 90e78dc7 5b02ac15 0c8f919b 7d120f72 afdd1d89 15227e62 e1ec1c97 56ad0216 6d0a61dc 1a042757 de291299 3f9f7e08 60b47c41 e98b6826 c15ccad0 8b6881ef ce0c

quit

crypto ca certificate chain JITC-Root

certificate ca 04

30820279 308201e2 a0030201 02020104 300d0609 2a864886 f70d0101 05050030 6a310b30 09060355 04061302 55533118 30160603 55040a13 0f552e53 2e20476f 7665726e 6d656e74 310c300a 06035504 0b130344 6f44310c 300a0603 55040b13 03504b49 31253023 06035504 03131c4a 49544320 446f4420 504b4920 436c6173 73203320 526f6f74 20434130 1e170d30 30303332 31313835 3834305a 170d3130 30333139 31383538 34305a30 6a310b30 09060355 04061302 55533118 30160603 55040a13 0f552e53 2e20476f 7665726e 6d656e74 310c300a 06035504 0b130344 6f44310c 300a0603 55040b13 03504b49 31253023 06035504 03131c4a 49544320 446f4420 504b4920 436c6173 73203320 526f6f74 20434130 819f300d 06092a86 4886f70d 01010105 0003818d 00308189 02818100 d150e084 198b8f13 f8647ffd 7aef4198 e436da72 6a078dc7 d5394342 1ef118be b51b17f5 7adaafa8 63adc158 3780316a 154a3b13 60518b5b d54f2e1a 4387441e 2a104dae 98ce8531 84b09134 8a32a7a2 54d0c7f2 ec474d19 216c9904 6b101f4b 3772ee10 b0cf2e58 a88106e5 7d0b9b0c 9895c5c0 c95aae17 c94e8020 fd588f29 02030100 01a32f30 2d301d06 03551d0e 04160414 6b9ff8f6 3db0e8aa 3d88f263 1d20efdc 6c1b774e 300c0603 551d1304 05300301 01ff300d 06092a86 4886f70d 01010505 00038181 0094f202 3b57c415 c25e2532 418f2774 9a12a641 836a7f68 5aa6018a 118d9a2e 9f609852 5e99cbf7 49318696 202f2555 e743ba2d aef6febf e09366c7 cc94e89b 690e3196 fc7a4b03 012e6638 963c89be 5aa8aecf d2d60c65 c22d24bb 5eb68796 25ba6203 e4831786 a19965c1 dc052d94 3f8f97d7 531b4bee e0f041b6 1e8556b0 e2 quit

crypto isakmp enable dmz

crypto isakmp enable outside

crypto isakmp policy 10

authentication rsa-sig

encryption aes-256

hash sha

group 5

lifetime 86400

tunnel-group DefaultRAGroup general-attributes

dhcp-server ad1.cisco.dod.mil

tunnel-group DefaultWEBVPNGroup general-attributes

address-pool vpnpool

authorization-server-group LOCAL

authorization-required

authorization-dn-attributes UPN

tunnel-group DefaultWEBVPNGroup webvpn-attributes

authentication certificate

tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN type ipsec-ra

tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN general-attributes

address-pool vpnpool

authorization-server-group AD-LDAP accounting-server-group ACS authorization-required authorization-dn-attributes UPN tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN ipsec-attributes chain trust-point JITC-CA7 isakmp ikev1-user-authentication none tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN ppp-attributes no authentication chap no authentication ms-chap-v1 tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN2 type ipsec-ra tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN2 general-attributes address-pool vpnpool authorization-server-group AD-LDAP-2 accounting-server-group ACS authorization-required authorization-dn-attributes UPN tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN2 ipsec-attributes chain trust-point JITC-CA7 isakmp ikev1-user-authentication none tunnel-group DODPKIRAVPN2 ppp-attributes no authentication ms-chap-v1 no tunnel-group-map enable ou no tunnel-group-map enable ike-id no tunnel-group-map enable peer-ip tunnel-group-map default-group DODPKIRAVPN no vpn-addr-assign aaa telnet 10.10.100.0 255.255.255.0 inside telnet timeout 5 ssh timeout 5

console timeout 0 dhcprelay server ad1.cisco.dod.mil inside ! class-map inspection_default match default-inspection-traffic ! ! policy-map type inspect dns migrated_dns_map_1 parameters message-length maximum 512 policy-map global_policy class inspection_default inspect dns migrated_dns_map_1 inspect ftp inspect h323 h225 inspect h323 ras inspect netbios inspect rsh inspect rtsp inspect skinny inspect esmtp inspect sqlnet inspect sunrpc inspect tftp inspect sip inspect xdmcp ! service-policy global_policy global ntp server 128.10.252.10 source outside prefer ssl encryption aes256-sha1 aes128-sha1 3des-sha1 ssl trust-point JITC-CA7 webvpn

enable outside

csd image disk0:/securedesktop-asa-3.1.1.29-k9.pkg

svc image disk0:/sslclient-win-1.1.0.154.pkg 1

prompt hostname context

Cryptochecksum:dbac441b510ac3685d9e5712e1ded6c2

: end



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