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CISCO NETWORK FOUNDATION PROTECTION: PROTECTING THE CISCO CATALYST SERIES PLATFORM

SECURITY TECHNOLOGY GROUP

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Network Foundation Protection, 1/05

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Agenda

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- Introduction
- Configuring Control Plane Protection
- Deployment Guide
- Summary and References



INTRODUCTION

Risk Landscape

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- Denial of Service (DoS) attacks target the network infrastructure by generating IP traffic streams to the control plane at very high rates
- The control plane is forced to spend an inordinate amount of time, processing this malicious traffic
- Results in excessive CPU utilization and CPU resource hijacking by the hackers
- Examples of such attacks include:
 - **TCP SYN floods**
 - **IP Fragments**
 - Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Echo Requests
 - **Fraggle Attacks**

Risk Landscape (Cont.)

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Attacks can devastate a network by causing:

High route processor CPU utilization (near 100%)

Loss of protocol keepalives and routing protocol updates

Route flaps and major network transitions

Slow or unresponsive interactive sessions via the CLI

Route Processor resource exhaustion

Resources such as memory and buffers are unavailable for legitimate IP data packets

Indiscriminate packet drops for all incoming packets

Keys to Prevent Attacks at the Routers

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• To protect the router mechanisms have to:

Identify DoS attack packets from valid packets (Classification)

Once identified, mark, drop, or rate-limit (Service Policies)

Separate data plane packets from control plane packets

Provide DoS mechanisms independent from existing interface capabilities, but do not impact current performance

Provide global CLI to minimize configuration changes to deployed networks

Securing the Router – Plane by Plane

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Think "Divide and Conquer": Methodical Approach to Protect Three Planes

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Cisco NFP – Network Foundation Protection Alcazar Program

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Secure Networks Must Be Built on a Secure Foundation



Cisco NFP – Three Planes Definitions

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Cisco Network Foundation Protection (NFP) is a Cisco IOS[®] Technology suite that protects network devices, routing and forwarding of control information, and management of traffic bounded to the network devices



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Introduction – Control Plane Protection Policing



Control Plane Protection – Policing for Cisco Catalyst Series Platform



Control Plane Protection – Policing for Cisco Catalyst Series Platform



Introduction – What CPU Rate Limiters Are Available?

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	Unicast Rate Limiters
CEF Receive	Traffic destined to the Router
CEF Glean	ARP packets
CEF No Route	Packets with not route in the FIB
IP Errors	Packets with IP checksum or length errors
ICMP Redirect	Packets that require ICMP redirects
ICMP No Route	ICMP unreachables for unroutable packets
ICMP ACL Drop	ICMP uncreachables for admin deny packets
RPF Failure	Packets that fail uRPF check
L3 Security	CBAC, Auth-Proxy, and IPSEC traffic
ACL Input	NAT, TCP Int, Reflexive ACLs, Log on ACLs
ACL Output	NAT, TCP Int, Reflexive ACLs, Log on ACLs
VACL Logging	CLI notification of VACL denied packets
IP Options	Unicast traffic with IP Options set
Capture	Used with Optimized ACL Logging

Unicast Rate Limiters		
Multicast FIB-Miss	Packets with no mroute in the FIB	
IGMP	IGMP packets	
Partial Shortcut	Partial shortcut entries	
Directly Connected	Local multicast on connected interface	
IP Options	Multicast traffic with IP Options set	3XL)
V6 Directly Connect	Packets with no mroute in the FIB	7
V6*, G M Bridge	IGMP Packets	
V6*, G Bridge	Partial shortcut entries	
V6 S, G Bridge	Partial shortcut entries	1
V6 Route Control	Partial shortcut entries	
V6 Default Route	Multicast traffic with IP Options set]
V6 Second Drop	Mulicast traffic with IP Options set	1

Shared across the 10 hardware Revocation Lists.

Layer 2 Rate Limiters		
L2PT	L2PT encapsulation/decapsulation	
PDU	Layer 2 PDUs	

General Rate Limiters		
MTU Failure	Packets requiring fragmentation	
TTL Failure	Packets with TTL<=1	

Interaction Between Control Plane Protection, Policing, and CPU Rate Limiter

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Test Setup – Mitigation of Multiple Attacks

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CPP configuration

policy-map CoPP

class cpp-bgp

police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action transmit exceed-action transmit class cpp-igp

police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action transmit exceed-action transmit class cpp-managment

police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action transmit exceed-action transmit class cpp-monitoring

police 600000 18750 18750 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop class cpp-critical

police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action transmit exceed-action transmit class cpp-undesirable

police 320000 10000 10000 conform-action drop exceed-action drop class cpp-default

police 620000 19375 19375 conform-action transmit exceed-action drop

CPU Rate Limiter configuration

mls rate-limit multicast ipv4 partial 1000 100

mls rate-limit unicast ip options 1000 10

mls rate-limit all ttl-failure 1000 10

CPU Rate Limiters Recommendations

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• Use all eight Layer 3 rate limiters!

Easy task

 Consider most likely attack vectors for the network environment

Enable the rate limiters most likely to be used

 Do not waste a rate-limiter on VACL logging, if it is not happening

No mls rate-limit unicast acl vacl

Disable redirects and save a rate limiter

Hardware forwarding platform reduces need for redirect efficiency

 Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) limiter is not required, if all interfaces have same MTU

CONFIGURING CONTROL PLANE PROTECTION



Configuring Control Plane Protection – Policing Four Step Process

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1. Define a packet classification criteria

router(config)# class-map <traffic_class_name>
router(config-cmap)# match <access-group>

2. Define a service policy

3. Enter control-plane configuration mode

router(config)# control-plane
router(config-cp)#

4. Apply QoS Policy

router(config-cp)# service-policy input <service_policy_name>

Control Plane Policing Configuration

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mls qos Otherwise, CoPP is performed in software only Define ACLs to match traffic Permit means traffic will belong to class; deny means will fall through Define class-maps (class-map <name>) Use "match" statements to identify traffic associated with the class match {access-group | ip {precedence | dscp}} Define policy-map (policy-map <name>) and associate classes and actions to it Policing is the only supported action Usual Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switch policing syntax Tie the policy-map to the control-plane interface

Must enable QoS globally! (mls gos)

ip access-list extended CPP-MANAGEMENT

remark Remote management

permit tcp any any eq SSH

permit tcp any eq 23 any

permit tcp any any eq 23

class-map match-all CPP-MANAGEMENT

description Important traffic,

Configuring CPU Rate Limiter

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Apply a CPU Rate Limiter at a specific rate Router(config)# mls rate-limit <all | unicast | multicast | layer 2> Special_case_rate_limiter> case_rate_limiter> cond>



DEPLOYMENT GUIDE

Deployment Guide – Step I Classify and Permit All Traffic

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- Identify traffic of interest and classify it into multiple traffic classes
 - BGP
 - IGP
 - Management
 - Reporting
 - Monitoring
 - **Critical Applications**
 - **Undesirable and Default**
- Use ACLs to identify traffic in each class
 - Match criteria supported includes:
 - ip standard ACL 1-99
 - ip extended ACL 100-199
- Use protocol and port number for Modular Quality of Service (QoS) Command Line Interface (MQC) match
- Last ACL entry permits ip any any
 - Otherwise, implicit deny statement
- Apply ACLs to class-maps and permit traffic in each class

Deployment Guide – Step II Review ACL Counters and Initial Policy

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 show policy-map control-plane and show mls qos ip command

Displays dynamic information for monitoring control plane policy

Statistics include rate information and number of packets/bytes confirmed or exceeding each traffic classes

show access-lists command

Provides packet count statistics per ACL entry (ACE), when traffic matches a particular entry

This data is used to develop a policy that ensures that identified traffic is matching as expected

Absence of any hits on an entry indicate lack of traffic matching the ACE criteria –the rule might be re-written

Deployment Guide – Step III Define Control Plane Policy

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 Explicitly allow needed and known critical protocols such as BGP and EIGRP

Conform and exceed action → transmit

 Define other required, but not critical traffic, such as ICMP, SNMP, SSH, Telnet, and default

Conform action \rightarrow transmit, exceed action \rightarrow drop

- Drop all other undesirable traffic
- Depending on class defined, apply appropriate policy Routing Protocol traffic (BGP, IGP) - no rate limit Management traffic (SNMP, SSH, NTP, and etc) – conservative rate limit Reporting traffic (SAA combined with DSCP) – conservative rate limit Monitoring traffic (ICMP, traceroute) – conservative rate limit Critical traffic (HSRP, SIP/VoIP, DLSw) – conservative rate limit Default traffic – low rate limit Undesirable traffic (DoS Attacks) – drop

Deployment Guide – Step IV Define CPU Rate Limiters

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- Use all eight Layer 3 rate limiters!
 Easy task
- Consider most likely attack vectors for the network environment Enable the rate limiters, which are most likely to be used
- Do not waste a rate-limiter on VACL logging, if it is not happening No mls rate-limit unicast acl vacl
- Disable redirects and save a rate limiter

Hardware forwarding platform reduces need for redirect efficiency

- MTU limiter is not required, if all interfaces have same MTU
- Configure PDU Layer 2 rate limiter with care

Calculate expected/possible number of valid PDUs (ballpark), double or triple them and include BPDUs, DTP, VTP, PAgP/LACP, UDLD, and etc.

Remember that Revocation Lists do not discriminate between "good" frames and "bad" frames

Deployment Guide – Step IV Which CPU Rate Limiters are Needed?

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- 1. Cisco Express Forwarding glean Limits traffic requiring ARP for a next hop Does NOT limit ARP traffic!
- 2. Multicast default adjacency Limits traffic punted to establish multicast control plane state (e.g.: new S,G traffic)
- 3. ACL bridged input
 - ACL bridged output

Limit packets with ACL bridge result (eg, "log" ACEs)

4. TTL failure

Limits unicast traffic with expiring TTL

5. Unicast IP options

Limits unicast packets with IP options

6. Multicast IP options

Limits multicast packets with IP options

Deployment Guide – Step IV Which CPU Rate Limiters are Needed?

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7. ICMP unreachables no-route ICMP unreachables ACL-drop Limit unroutable or ACL-denied traffic 8. IP errors Limits error packets (e. g.: bad L3 checksum, L2/L3 length mismatch) 9. IP RPF traffic Limits uRPF failed traffic Freebie along with above limiters **10.** ICMP redirect Limits traffic punted to trigger a redirect 11. Multicast IGMP (Layer 2) Limits IGMP packets to the SP CPU 12. Layer 2 PDU (Layer 2) Limits Layer 2 protocol data units (BPDUs, VTP, DTP, PAgP, etc)

Deployment Guide – Step V Fine Tune the Policy

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- Ensure that unexpected results are investigated
- Increasingly restrict source and destination addresses
 Only certain hosts send SNMP polls, ICMP requests, or SSH/telnet into a router
- BGP peers are using loopback
- Use class-default to identify unclassified packets
- Remove permit ip any any when confident with results
- Additional information:

www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_whi te_paper09186a0080211f39.shtml

Control Plane Policy Template

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- class-map match-all cpp-bgp
 BGP
- class-map match-all cpp-igp
 - EIGRP, OSPF, etc...
- class-map match-all cpp-management
 - SNMP, NTP, SSH, TACACS, TFTP, etc...
- class-map match-all cpp-reporting
 - Echo, echo-reply with DSCP marking per class
- class-map match-all cpp-monitoring
 - ICMP, traceroute, etc...
- class-map match-all cpp-critical-applications
 - HSRP, DLSw, SIP/VoIP, etc...
- class-map match-all cpp-layer-2-protocols
 ARP
- class-map match-all cpp-default
 - Non-specifically marked traffic
- class-map match-any cpp-deny
 - Classified attack traffic

SUMMARY AND REFERENCES



Summary – Control Plane Protection Policing

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Unicast Traffic

Hardware mechanism for defining and implementing sophisticated router protection schemes

Multicast Traffic

Hardware independent mechanism for defining and implementing sophisticated router protection scheme after first pass through CPU rate limiters

- Protection against DoS attacks targeted towards the network infrastructure
- Easy deployment by leveraging existing MQC infrastructure
- Consistent implementation strategy across all Cisco hardware
- Increased reliability, security, and availability of the network

References

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www.cisco.com/go/autosecure/

Cisco IOS Software Release 12.2(18)SXD

www.cisco.com/go/release122s/

Deploying Control Plane Protection - Policing

www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_white_pape r09186a0080211f39.shtml

Control Plane Protection – Policing Feature Guide

www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_feature_gui de09186a00801afad4.html

QoS Command Reference Guide

www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps5207/products_command_ reference_book09186a00801a7ec7.html

Hardware Support

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Hardware	Availability
 Cisco 7600 Series Router Cisco Catalyst[®] 6500 Series 	Cisco IOS Software Release
Switch	12.2(18)SXD1
Cisco 7200 Series Router	Cisco IOS Software Release
Cisco 7500 Series Router	12.2(18)S
 Cisco 12000 Series Internet Router 	 Cisco IOS Software Release 12.0(29)S
Cisco 1751 Series Router	 Cisco IOS Software Release 12.3(4)T
Cisco 2600-XM Series	
Cisco 3700 Series Router	
Cisco 7200 Series Router	

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