Verification and Troubleshooting

This chapter provides tips to assist in verification and troubleshooting the implementation. Specific troubleshooting discussions address the following:

- Packet Fragmentation, page 7-1
- Displaying Anti-Replay Drops, page 7-2
- Verifying Tunnel Interfaces and EIGRP Neighbors, page 7-3
- How EIGRP calculates RTO values for Tunnel Interfaces, page 7-4
- Using NetFlow to Verify Layer-3 Packet Sizes, page 7-5
- Using NetFlow to Verify ToS Values, page 7-6
- Sample Show Commands for IPSec, page 7-8
- Clearing IPSec and IKE Security Associations, page 7-10
- Sample Show Commands for QoS, page 7-12

Packet Fragmentation

IPSec and IP GRE headers increase the size of the original packet. Chapter 4, "Planning and Design,"illustrates how a 60-byte G.729 voice packet expands to 136 bytes after addition of the additional headers and trailer. While these relatively small voice packets would not exceed an interface's MTU, data packets at or near MTU size could require fragmentation by the initial or intermediate routers.

Packet fragmentation should be avoided as it decreases router performance, both on the fragmenting router and by the end station. Since encryption is being done with IPSec routers, the end station could be the decrypting router. Fragmentation is performed after encryption and before decrypting; the decrypting router must process switch the packet since it must receive and re-assemble all fragments before decryption.

Fragmentation should be avoided by using either path MTU discovery or manually setting the MTU of the workstations to 1400 bytes. Cisco's VPN Client installation provides a utility that changes the workstation's MTU. From the Window's task bar, select Start, Search, for Files or Folders and search for **SetMTU.exe**. Execute this program, set the MTU to 1400 bytes and reboot.

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To eliminate DLSw induced fragmentation consider defining a MAXDATA value which is smaller than the DLSw, IPsec and GRE overhead. The MAXDATA value is defined under the PU2.0 definition for the switched major node. This value indicates the maximum number of bytes a PU 2.0 device can send/receive. The value specified includes SNA overhead. For example:

MAXDATA=1033,

The default value (line 382) for a Cisco 3174 configuration is 521, a value of 265 is also commonly used.

To set the MTU on a Macintosh with OS X with the terminal program—it requires *sudo* or *root* access. Sudo access can be enabled through the *NetInfo Manager* application located under *Applications –> Utilities*. Users must go to the *Domain* pull down menu and under *Security* select *Enable Root Account*.

Step 1 Identify your network port with Terminal program: ifconfig -a

Step 2 Enter this command: sudo /sbin/ifconfig en0 mtu 1400



Assumes **en0** was the interface identified in prior step.

To display if the encrypting router is fragmenting packets, issue the following command several times while the network is in use:

```
sh ip traffic | include fragmented
    4003204 fragmented, 0 couldn't fragment
```

If the fragmented counter is increasing, fragmentation is occurring. Refer to the "Using NetFlow to Verify Layer-3 Packet Sizes" section on page 7-5 for information about how to use NetFlow to verify packet sizes. Enable NetFlow switching on the interface shared with the workstations to determine the size of the packets prior to encryption.

Fragmentation does not degrade performance of intermediate routers not involved in the fragmentation or re-assembly process. Fragmented packets maintain the ToS byte of the original packet and intermediate router's QoS policy is not affected.

Displaying Anti-Replay Drops

The procedure for displaying packets dropped due to the anti-replay logic differs depending if a hardware crypto accelerator is used or if encryption/decryption is done by software. Since hardware crypto accelerators are recommended for voice, those display examples are presented in this section. With hardware crypto accelerators, the sequence failures are checked and reported by the card, and are not IPSec Security Association (SA) specific, as is the case with software. The counters are an accumulation for all IPSec peers for this router:

For the Cisco 1700, Cisco 2600, Cisco 3600, and Cisco 3700 platforms the command is:

```
vpn13-1700-4#show crypto engine accelerator statistic | include esp_seq_fail
esp_prot_absent:0 esp_seq_fail: 0 esp_spi_failure: 0
For Cisco 7100 and Cisco 7200 platforms the commands are:
vpn3-7200-1#show pas isa int | include esp_seq_fail
esp_seq_failure: 249088 esp_spi_failure: 0
vpn3-7200-1#show pas vam int | include pkt_replay_err
```

pkt_replay_err : 0

rng st fail

: 0

The counters are accumulated since the hardware crypto accelerator was last initialized or manually cleared with the **clear crypto engine accelerator counter** command.

Verifying Tunnel Interfaces and EIGRP Neighbors

Before attempting to configure IPSec and encrypt voice packets on the network, verify all the configured interfaces are in UP/UP state:

```
vpn13-1700-4#show interface | include is up
```

FastEthernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up Serial1/0 is up, line protocol is up Serial1/0.1 is up, line protocol is up Loopback0 is up, line protocol is up Tunnel0 is up, line protocol is up Tunnel1 is up, line protocol is up

Verify that the IPSec/IP GRE head-end routers are neighbors over the tunnel interfaces. This display is from a branch router.

vpn	pn13-1700-4# show ip eigrp neighbors								
IP-	P-EIGRP neighbors for process 1								
Н	Address	Interface	Hold Uptime	SRTT	RTO	Q	Seq Type		
			(sec)	(ms)		Cnt	Num		
1	10.63.88.193	Tu0	13 1w5d	47	5000	0	208349		
0	10.63.88.197	Tu1	13 1w5d	46	5000	0	302665		

For the same branch router, look at the routing table:

```
vpn13-1700-4#show ip route
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area
      N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP
       i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, ia - IS-IS inter area
       * - candidate default, U - per-user static route, o - ODR
       P - periodic downloaded static route
Gateway of last resort is 192.168.224.1 to network 0.0.0.0
     192.168.224.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets
С
        192.168.224.0 is directly connected, Serial1/0.1
     10.0.0.0/8 is variably subnetted, 7 subnets, 5 masks
        10.0.0.0/8 [90/297246976] via 10.63.88.193, 1w5d, Tunnel0
D
D
        10.63.88.0/24 is a summary, 1w5d, Null0
        10.63.88.0/25 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0
С
С
        10.63.88.254/32 is directly connected, Loopback0
        10.63.88.196/30 is directly connected, Tunnel1
С
        10.63.88.192/30 is directly connected, Tunnel0
С
S*
     0.0.0.0/0 [1/0] via 192.168.224.1
```

Note from the above display, network 10.0.0.0/8 was learned from the primary tunnel, Tunnel0. Only the route from the primary tunnel is inserted into the routing table, since in the configuration the interface delay for Tunnel1 was increased, making it an alternate or backup path. Also, note the summary route for 10.63.88.0/24 to the Null0 interface. This is the result of the manual summarization statement on the tunnel interfaces. In this example, only one EIGRP route is being learned through the Tunnel interfaces and only one route is being advertised to each IPSec/IP GRE head-end router.

How EIGRP calculates RTO values for Tunnel Interfaces

This design illustrates the use of EIGRP and GRE Tunnel interfaces. The default bandwidth for a Tunnel interface in Cisco IOS software is 9 Kbps. EIGRP calculates for each neighbor a Retransmission timeout (RTO) value in milliseconds. The RTO value is the amount of time Cisco IOS software waits before a retransmit of a reliable packet (EIGRP an update, query, reply) to its neighbor if an acknowledgement is not received.

The RTO value is computed by calculating:

- The current SRRT for the peer multiplied by 6
- The Pacing Timer for the interface multiplied by 6

Select the higher value of these two calculations. If either computed value is greater than 5,000 milliseconds, the RTO value is set to 5,000 milliseconds, or 5 seconds.

The pacing timer for an interface is calculated from the bandwidth value of the interface. The lower the bandwidth value, the higher the computed pacing timer. The pacing timer is the means to throttle EIGRP's utilization of an interface for routing protocol traffic. By default EIGRP uses up to 50 percent of the bandwidth available. This value can be changed by invoking the **ip bandwidth-percent eigrp** configuration command.

As an illustration, with the default tunnel bandwidth value of 9 Kbps, the RTO calculation would be 2702 * 6 = 16,212 which is greater than 5,000, so the value of 5,000 is used for the RTO.

```
vpn-jk-2600-25#show interfaces tunnel 0 | include BW
 MTU 1514 bytes, BW 9 Kbit, DLY 500000 usec,
vpn-jk-2600-25#show ip eigrp interfaces
IP-EIGRP interfaces for process 45
                       Xmit Queue
                                           Pacing Time
                                                        Multicast
                                                                     Pending
                                   Mean
                Peers Un/Reliable SRTT
Interface
                                          Un/Reliable
                                                        Flow Timer
                                                                     Routes
Fa0/1
                  0
                           0/0
                                     0
                                              0/10
                                                            0
                                                                         0
T110
                  1
                           0/0
                                    649
                                              71/2702
                                                          5894
                                                                         0
vpn-jk-2600-25#show ip eigrp neighbors detail
IP-EIGRP neighbors for process 45
                                          Hold Uptime
  Address
                                                               RTO Q Seq Tye
Н
                           Interface
                                                        SRTT
                                                                   Cnt Num
                                          (sec)
                                                        (ms)
0
   10.248.0.2
                          T110
                                            13 05:05:26 649 5000 0 2
  Version 12.2/1.2, Retrans: 0, Retries: 0
```

Looking at a tunnel interface which was configured to use a bandwidth value of 56 Kbps, the RTO calculation would be: 434 * 6 = 2,604

vpn-jk-2600-25#show interfaces tunnel 0 | include BW MTU 1514 bytes, BW 56 Kbit, DLY 500000 usec,

vpn-jk-2600-25#show ip eigrp interfaces
IP-EIGRP interfaces for process 45

			Xmit Queue	Mean	Pacing Time	Multi	cast	P	endir	ng
Int	erface	Peers	Un/Reliable	SRTT	Un/Reliable	Flow	Timer	R	outes	5
Fa0	/1	0	0/0	0	0/10		0		0	
Tu0)	1	0/0	56	11/434	43	4		0	
vpn	-jk-2600-25#s	how ip	eigrp neighbo	rs deta	ail					
IP-	EIGRP neighbo	rs for	process 45							
Н	Address		Interfac	е	Hold Uptime	SRTT	RTO	Q	Seq	Tye
					(sec)	(ms)		Cnt	Num	
0	10.248.0.2		Tu0		14 00:00:18	56	2604	0	4	
	Version 12.2/	1.2. Re	trans: 1. Ret	ries: (2					

In either of the above two examples, the SRRT value multiplied by 6 is less than the RTO value multiplied by 6.

A RTO value of 5,000 in itself does not present a problem to the design. The use of manual summarization (and EIGRP stub) in this design minimizes the number of EIGRP updates, queries and replies which must be transmitted between branches and head-end routers. Increasing the bandwidth value for a tunnel interface decreases the pacing time, which allows EIGRP updates, queries and replies to be sent more frequently, but with good summarization the number of these transactions should be minimal.

Using NetFlow to Verify Layer-3 Packet Sizes

The topology shown in Figure 7-1 is used in this section to illustrate the use of NetFlow to verify Layer-3 packet sizes.

Figure 7-1 Netflow Example Topology



Generate **60-byte** (Layer-3) packets with a traffic generator, then use the following command to capture packet information

```
vpn18-2(TGN:ON,Fa0/1:1/1)#show ip
Summary of IP traffic streams on FastEthernet0/1
ts# tos len id frag ttl protocol chksm source destination
1 UDP A0 60 0000 0000 60 17 6890 10.0.1.2 10.127.0.1
```

Given the following configuration of the router decrypting the traffic, verify the packet sizes by enabling Netflow on the Serial and Tunnel interfaces so the same flow is captured both encrypted and unencrypted:

```
I
hostname vpn18-2600-3
interface Tunnel0
 ip address 10.0.96.2 255.255.255.0
 ip route-cache flow
 tunnel source Loopback0
 tunnel destination 192.168.2.1
 crypto map GRE
!
interface Serial0/1
no ip address
 encapsulation frame-relay
 ip route-cache flow
 frame-relay traffic-shaping
1
interface Serial0/1.100 point-to-point
bandwidth 64
```

L

```
ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.252
 frame-relay interface-dlci 100
 class ts-branch
 crypto map GRE
vpn18-2600-3#sh ip cache verbose flow | begin TOS
SrcIf
              SrcIPaddress
                                                            Pr TOS Flgs Pkts
                              DstIf
                                           DstIPaddress
Port Msk AS
                              Port Msk AS
                                            NextHop
                                                                B/Pk Active
Tu0
              10.0.1.2
                              Fa0/1
                                            10.127.0.1
                                                            11 A0 10
                                                                        3607
7D05 /0 0
                              7D09 /24 0
                                            10.254.0.45
                                                                   60
                                                                        72.1
                                                            32 00 10
Se0/1.100
              192.168.1.1
                                            192.168.1.2
                                                                        2462
                             Local
E74D /30 0
                              2454 /30 0
                                           0.0.0.0
                                                                        49.1
                                                                 136
Τu0
              192.168.2.1
                             Null
                                            192.168.1.6
                                                           11 00 10
17 01F4 /0 0
                              01F4 /0 0
                                            0.0.0.0
                                                                 112
                                                                       140.9
```

In the **show ip cache** output, the first flow is the UDP packets from the traffic generator, after they were decrypted; the second line shows the IPSec ESP packet (protocol 50) from the Serial interface before it was decrypted; and the last packet is an IKE packet. The increase in packet size (NetFlow reports Layer-3 packet lengths) can be calculated by subtracting the average bytes per packet before and after the IPSec and IP GRE headers. In this case the original packet was 60 bytes, with IPSec (tunnel mode) and IP GRE 136 bytes.



In the preceding **show ip cache** output, NetFlow reports the ToS byte as zero. NetFlow maps the bits from the from *ip_more_fragment* flag into the ToS byte for IPSec ESP (protocol 50) and AH (protocol 51) tunnels. IP GRE tunnels are handled differently. IP GRE flows are displayed as separate flows if the pre-IP GRE tunnel-encapsulated packets have varying ToS bytes.

Using NetFlow to Verify ToS Values

The topology shown below in Figure 7-2 is used to illustrate using NetFlow to verify ToS values from the LAN. There is a dedicated DLSw router advertising its loopback interface via EIGRP to the WAN router that would be the IPSec peer router.





This is a ToS verification technique which can be done remotely or without the need for a protocol analyzer on the LAN/WAN. This is an alternative to exporting NetFlow to a Collector/Analyzer or other third party collection device. On the WAN router enable NetFlow switching:

!									
interface	e FastI	Ethernet0/1							
ip addre	ess 10.	.254.0.45 255.2	255.255.0						
ip rout	e-cache	e flow							
end									
vpn-18-2	500-5# £	show ip cache v	verbose flow	▼	begin TOS				
SrcIf		SrcIPaddress	DstIf		DstIPaddress	Pr	TOS	Flg	s Pkts
Port Msk	AS		Port Msk	AS	NextHop		В	/Pk	Active
Fa0/1		10.254.0.47	Null		224.0.0.10	58	C0	10	116
0000 /0	0		0000 /0	0	0.0.0.0			60	533.1
Fa0/1		10.251.0.1	Local		10.254.0.45	06	40	18	2
0811 /0	0		2B06 /0	0	0.0.0.0			46	0.0

From the above **show ip cache** output, note an EIGRP hello and DLSw flow. These values need to be converted from hex to decimal.

The EIGRP flow is identified by protocol 88 (0x58).



The TOS byte is 0xC0, or IP Precedence 6. See Figure 7-3.

DLSw listens by default on TCP (protocol 0x06) port 2065 (0x0811). In this example, the default IP Precedence value for DLSw was changed from 5 to 2, to match the service policy's "mission-critical" class.





Table 7-1 ToS Byte Reference

TOS Hex	TOS Decimal ¹	IP Precedence	Class-map Name (Used in Examples)	DSCP	Binary
E0	224	7 Network Control		CS7	111 00000
C0	192	6 Internetwork Control	mission-critical	CS6	110 00000
B8	184		voice	EF	101 11000
A0	160	5 Critical		CS5	101 00000
80	128	4 Flash Override		CS4	100 00000

TOS Hex	TOS Decimal ¹	IP Precedence	Class-map Name (Used in Examples)	DSCP	Binary
68	104		call-setup	AF31	011 01000
60	96	3 Flash		CS3	011 00000
40	64	2 Immediate	mission-critical	CS2	010 00000
20	32	1 Priority		CS1	001 00000
00	0	0 Routine		default	000 00000

Table 7-1	ToS Byte	e Reference
-----------	----------	-------------

1. If the TOS hex value converted to decimal falls between the illustrated decimal values, IP Precedence matches on the next lower value. For example, TOS decimal values between 160 and 191 are IP Precedence 5.

The relevant configuration is as follows:

```
class-map match-all call-setup
match ip precedence 3
class-map match-any mission-critical
match ip precedence 2
match ip precedence 6
class-map match-all voice
match ip precedence 5
```

Sample Show Commands for IPSec

The following commands can be used to verify the implementation values are consistent with these recommendations:

The **show crypto map** command is used to verify the crypto map configuration. This command facilitates verification of the crypto local and peer IP addresses and the GRE IP addresses match, since in the configuration this information is normally not visible on one page. Also helps to verify that the crypto map is applied to the appropriate output and tunnel interfaces.

```
vpn13-1700-4#show crypto map
Crypto Map: "static-map" idb: Serial1/0.1 local address: 192.168.224.2
Crypto Map "static-map" 10 ipsec-isakmp
Peer = 192.168.252.1
Extended IP access list vpn-static1
   access-list vpn-static1 permit gre host 192.168.224.2 host 192.168.252.1
Current peer: 192.168.252.1
Security association lifetime: 4608000 kilobytes/3600 seconds
PFS (Y/N): N
Transform sets={
vpn-test,
}
Crypto Map "static-map" 20 ipsec-isakmp
Peer = 192.168.251.1
Extended IP access list vpn-static2
   access-list vpn-static2 permit gre host 192.168.224.2 host 192.168.251.1
Current peer: 192.168.251.1
```

```
Security association lifetime: 4608000 kilobytes/3600 seconds
PFS (Y/N): N
Transform sets={
  vpn-test,
  }
Interfaces using crypto map static-map:
  Serial1/0.1
Tunnel0
Tunnel1
```

With the **show crypto isakmp sa** command, the state is normally QM_IDLE and there are two IKE security associations, one to each head end router, from the branch perspective. Either the branch or the head-end router can initiate an IKE session, so the destination (dst) and source (src) IP addresses don't have any particular meaning or affinity.

vpn13-1700-4# shc	w crypto isakmp	sa		
dst	src	state	conn-id	slot
192.168.224.2	192.168.252.1	QM_IDLE	1	0
192.168.251.1	192.168.224.2	QM_IDLE	2	0

The **show crypto engine connections active** shows both IKE Security associations as well as IPSec. From the previous display, the connection-id of the IKE SAs are 1 and 2, and they are both shown below. From the branch router's perspective, there should normally be four IPSec SAs, since there are two head-end routers and there is a transmit (Encrypt) and receive (Decrypt) SA for each head-end. Note that since the recommended configuration has a primary and secondary IP GRE tunnel, the packet counts are much higher to the primary head-end than to the secondary head-end. Only EIGRP hellos and any other background traffic are traversing the tunnel to the secondary head-end unless the primary fails.

vpn13-1700-4#show crypto engine connections active

ID	Interface	IP-Address	State	Algorithm	Encrypt	Decrypt
1	Se1/0.1	192.168.224.2	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
2	Tunnel0	10.63.88.194	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
1910	Tunnel0	10.63.88.194	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	567
1911	Tunnel0	10.63.88.194	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	567	0
1912	Tunnel0	10.63.88.194	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	72
1913	Tunnel0	10.63.88.194	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	72	0

Use the **show crypto isakmp policy** to verify the IKE policy and how it differs from the default configuration.

```
vpn13-1700-4#show crypto isakmp policy
Protection suite of priority 1
encryption algorithm: Three key triple DES
hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard
authentication method: Pre-Shared Key
Diffie-Hellman group: #2 (1024 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
Default protection suite
encryption algorithm: DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys).
hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard
authentication method: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature
Diffie-Hellman group: #1 (768 bit)
lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
```

Use the **show crypto ipsec transform-set** to verify of the transform set options as well as tunnel verses transport mode for IPSec.

```
vpn13-1700-4#show crypto ipsec transform-set
Transform set vpn-test: { esp-3des esp-sha-hmac }
negotiate = { Tunnel, },
```

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Clearing IPSec and IKE Security Associations

When making configuration changes or after a router reload, security associations (SAs) can become 'stale', (invalid or out of sync) between two IPSec peers. In some instances this can be the cause for IPSec connectivity failures. This is more common when using IPSec without GRE tunnels and a routing protocol, as the data traffic of the hello packets from the routing protocol forces new SAs to be built to receive and transmit the hellos.

Two clear commands can be used to flush the database and eliminate any legacy negotiations:

clear crypto isakmp

clear crypto sa

Here is an example to illustrate this point and steps through clearing both the IKE and IPSec SAs. Router *vpn18-2600-22* is a head-end IPSec/GRE router with one remote router, *vpn18-2600-18*, which has an IPSec/GRE tunnel to two head-end routers.

From the *vpn18-2600-22* device's perspective, there is an IKE and a transmit and receive IPSec SA to the remote router. The remote router is reloaded to simulate a branch failure; note that the EIGRP neighbor goes down and returns.

vpn18-2600-22#show crypto engine connections active

ID	Interface	IP-Address	State	Algorithm	Encrypt	Decrypt
1	FastEthernet0/1	23.0.1.22	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
2426	Tunnel0	10.96.1.2	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	312
2427	Tunnel0	10.96.1.2	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	312	0
vpn18	3-2600-22#					
1w4d	: %DUAL-5-NBRCHAN	NGE: IP-EIGRP 45:	: Neighl	oor 10.96.1.1 (Tunne	10) is dou	wn: hold
vpn18	3-2600-22#					
1w4d	: %DUAL-5-NBRCHAN	NGE: IP-EIGRP 45:	: Neighl	oor 10.96.1.1 (Tunne	10) is up	: new ay
vpn18	3-2600-22# show c	rypto engine conn	nections	s active		
ID	Interface	IP-Address	State	Algorithm	Encrypt	Decrypt
1	FastEthernet0/1	23.0.1.22	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
2	FastEthernet0/1	23.0.1.22	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
2428	Tunnel0	10.96.1.2	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
2429	Tunnel0	10.96.1.2	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0

set

set



Connection ID 2428 and 2429 are extraneous, they are not being used to encrypt or decrypt traffic. From the branch perspective, following the reload.

HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C

HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C

0

154

154

0

vpn18-2600-18#show crypto engine connections active

10.96.1.2

10.96.1.2

ID	Interface	IP-Address	State	Algorithm	Encrypt	Decrypt
1	<none></none>	<none></none>	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
2	<none></none>	<none></none>	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
420	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
421	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
422	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	187
423	Tunne10	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	185	0
424	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
425	Tunne10	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
426	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	184
427	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	184	0

2430 Tunnel0

2431 Tunnel0

The branch has two active IPSec SAs to each head-end, Ids 422/423 and 426/427 and two IKE SAs, 1 and 2. Clearing the SAs eliminates the redundant SAs.

```
vpn18-2600-18#clear crypto sa
vpn18-2600-18#show crypto engine connections active
```

Interface	IP-Address	State	Algorithm	Encrypt	Decrypt
<none></none>	<none></none>	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
<none></none>	<none></none>	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	0
Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	2
Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	2	0
Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	2
Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	1	0
	Interface <none> Tunnel0 Tunnel0 Tunnel0 Tunnel0 Tunnel0</none>	Interface IP-Address <none> <none> <none> <none> Tunnel0 10.96.1.1 Tunnel0 10.96.1.1 Tunnel0 10.96.1.1 Tunnel0 10.96.1.1</none></none></none></none>	InterfaceIP-AddressState <none><none>set<none><none>setTunnel010.96.1.1setTunnel010.96.1.1setTunnel010.96.1.1setTunnel010.96.1.1set</none></none></none></none>	InterfaceIP-AddressStateAlgorithm <none><none>setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C<none>setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_CTunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_CTunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_CTunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_CTunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_CTunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C</none></none></none>	InterfaceIP-AddressStateAlgorithmEncrypt <none><none>setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C0<none>setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C0Tunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C2Tunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C2Tunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C0Tunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C0Tunnel010.96.1.1setHMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C1</none></none></none>

After the clear command, there are two IKE SAs, and four IPSec SAs, a transmit and receive tunnel to each head-end.

Now, looking at the IKE SAs, they are in a normal state Quick-Mode Idle, clearing them deletes the IKE SAs.

vpn18-2600-18	#show crypto isa	kmp sa			
dst	src	state	conn-id	slot	
23.0.32.22	23.0.218.1	QM_IDLE	2	0	
23.0.32.23	23.0.218.1	QM_IDLE	1	0	
vpn18-2600-18	#clear crypto is	akmp			
vpn18-2600-18	#show crypto isa	kmp sa			
dst	src	state	conn-id	slot	
23.0.32.22	23.0.218.1	MM_NO_STATE	2	0	(deleted)
23.0.32.23	23.0.218.1	MM_NO_STATE	1	0	(deleted)
10 0600 10					
vpn18-2600-18	#show crypto isa	.kmp sa			
dst	src	state	conn-id	slot	

Note The IKE SAs were deleted but have not been re-established, they are not needed at this time, since the IPSec SAs have not expired. They are still encrypting and decrypting packets. New IKE SAs are not required until the IPSec SAs timeout (exceed their lifetime, either triggered by time or data volume) and must be re-established.

vpn18-2600-18#show crypto engine connections act

ID	Interface	IP-Address	State	Algorithm	Encrypt	Decrypt
420	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	63
421	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	62	0
422	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	0	62
423	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_56_C	61	0

To force IKE SAs establishment, clear the IPSec SAs (IKE SAs need to be build to establish new IPSec SAs).

vpn18-2600-18#clear crypto sa vpn18-2600-18#show crypto engine connections act

ID	Interface	IP-Address	State	Algorithm		Encrypt	Decrypt
1	<none></none>	<none></none>	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_	56_C	0	(
2	<none></none>	<none></none>	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_	56_C	0	C
420	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_	56_C	0	11
421	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_	56_C	12	C
422	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_	56_C	0	11
423	Tunnel0	10.96.1.1	set	HMAC_SHA+3DES_	56_C	11	C
vpn18	8-2600-18# sho	w crypto isakm	o sa				
dst	S	rc	state	conn-id	slot		
23.0	.32.22 2	3.0.218.1	QM_IDLE	1	0		
23.0	.32.23 2	3.0.218.1	QM_IDLE	2	0		

From the above display, the router is functioning normally, and the expected number of security associations are seen in the display.

Sample Show Commands for QoS

Use the **show policy-map interface** to verify the offered rate of traffic isn't greater than the allocated bandwidth for the voice, call-setup and mission-critical classes, as drops in these classes impact voice quality, call setup and the important data applications.

If there are drops in the voice class, either the call admission control configuration is not consistent with the amount of bandwidth allocated for voice calls, or there could be a minor amount of jitter in the call that is causing the voice packets to arrive slightly over the rate calculated per call. If the call admission control issue was verified, the CODEC type isn't G.711 when it was planned to be G.729, and there is a minor amount of voice being dropped, then increase the value of the priority queue until the drops stop.

If there are drops in the IP Precedence 6 class within mission-critical, expect to experience EIGRP neighbors drop. The service policy should be tuned to prevent EIGRP packets from being dropped, as EIGRP packet drops cause instability in the network.

In the release of code tested, the *offered rate* (in bits per second) does not include GRE and IPSec header overhead; however, the packets per second rates should report accurate packet rates.

```
vpn13-1700-4#show policy-map interface serial 1/0.1
Serial1/0.1: DLCI 101 -
Service-policy output: llq-branch
Class-map: call-setup (match-all)
  0 packets, 0 bytes
  30 second offered rate 0 bps, drop rate 0 bps
  Match: ip precedence 3
  Weighted Fair Queueing
    Output Queue: Conversation 41
    Bandwidth 5 (%)
    Bandwidth 24 (kbps) Max Threshold 64 (packets)
    (pkts matched/bytes matched) 0/0
    (depth/total drops/no-buffer drops) 0/0/0
Class-map: mission-critical (match-any)
    2992 packets, 392844 bytes
```

30 second offered rate 2000 bps, drop rate 0 bps Match: ip precedence 2 0 packets, 0 bytes 30 second rate 0 bps Match: ip precedence 6 2992 packets, 392844 bytes 30 second rate 2000 bps Weighted Fair Queueing Output Queue: Conversation 42 Bandwidth 22 (%) Bandwidth 106 (kbps) Max Threshold 64 (packets) (pkts matched/bytes matched) 2994/393695 (depth/total drops/no-buffer drops) 0/0/0 Class-map: voice (match-all) 0 packets, 0 bytes 30 second offered rate 0 bps, drop rate 0 bps Match: ip precedence 5 Weighted Fair Queueing Strict Priority Output Queue: Conversation 40 Bandwidth 168 (kbps) Burst 4200 (Bytes) (pkts matched/bytes matched) 0/0 (total drops/bytes drops) 0/0 Class-map: class-default (match-any) 26601 packets, 10030161 bytes 30 second offered rate 0 bps, drop rate 0 bps Match: any Weighted Fair Queueing Flow Based Fair Queueing Maximum Number of Hashed Queues 32

(total queued/total drops/no-buffer drops) 0/0/0

Use the **show frame-relay fragment** command to verify the fragment size in bytes, and the number of packets that require fragmentation.

vpn13-1700-4# show	frame-	relay fragmen	nt			
interface	dlci	frag-type	frag-size	in-frag	out-frag	dropped-frag
Serial1/0.1	101	end-to-end	640	154	154	0

